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THERE’S A HOLE IN MY BUCKET DEAR LIZA, DEAR
LIZA: THE 30-YEAR ANNIVERSARY OF THE HATCHWAXMAN ACT: RESOLVED AND UNRESOLVED GAPS
AND COURT-DRIVEN POLICY GAP FILLING1
Shashank Upadhye†
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1308
II. A BRIEF BACKGROUND TO THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT ........ 1311
III. BACKGROUND ON THE BRAND AND GENERIC DRUG
APPROVAL PROCESS ............................................................. 1313
1. The holes in the Act and continuous attempts to fill them based on the
Act itself, case precedent, and new legislation reminds me of the old song,
“There’s a Hole In My Bucket,” which
is a children’s song based on a dialogue about a leaky bucket between
two characters, called Henry and Liza. The song describes a deadlock
situation: Henry has got a leaky bucket, and Liza tells him to repair it.
But to fix the leaky bucket, he needs straw. To cut the straw, he needs a
knife. To sharpen the knife, he needs to wet the sharpening stone. To
wet the stone, he needs water. However, when Henry asks how to get
the water, Liza’s answer is ‘in a bucket.’ It is implied that only one
bucket is available—the leaky one, which, if it could carry water, would
not need repairing in the first place.”
There’s a Hole in my Bucket, WIKIPEDIA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There’s_a
_Hole_in_My_Bucket (last visited Aug. 23, 2013). As with the song, some will say
that the beginning and ending point with the entire regime is the Act itself and it
has no problem.
†
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LLP. He is a globally recognized expert in the field of pharmaceutical IP and FDA
regulatory law. He is formerly the VP-Global Head of IP for Apotex, Inc. (Toronto,
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eleven law review articles related to IP, pharmaceutical, antitrust, and
international law. He received his LLM in IP (John Marshall Law School, Chicago,
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Hatch-Waxman Act governs the approval of medical
devices and pharmaceuticals. Its official name is the Drug Price
2
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. Its
2. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman)
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). Known more commonly by its popular title,
the “Hatch-Waxman Act,” derived from the surnames of the Act’s principal
sponsors, was passed with the express purpose of expediting the entry of
noninfringing generic competitors into pharmaceutical drug markets in order to
decrease healthcare costs for consumers. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S.
Ct. 2466, 2471 (2013) (“In order to provide a swifter route for approval of generic
drugs, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1585, popularly known as the ‘Hatch-Waxman Act.’ Under
Hatch–Waxman, a generic drug may be approved without the same level of
clinical testing required for approval of a new brand-name drug, provided the
generic drug is identical to the already-approved brand-name drug in several key
respects.”); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574 (2011) reh’g denied, 132 S.
Ct. 55 (2011) (“In 1984, however, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act, 98 Stat. 1585, commonly called the Hatch-
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unofficial name is the Litigator’s Full Employment Act, because the
Act, as promulgated, was cumbersome, indecipherable in certain
3
areas, and hardly a model of elegant statutory draftsmanship. To
this end, parties and their lawyers found gaps and have gamed the
Act. Many complained the interpretation (and misinterpretation)
of the Act created wrong law, wrong policy—or quite the opposite,
the correct law and correct policy. Some have complained that the
1984 Act now does not do enough, and that the rationales justifying
4
the Act no longer apply to modern realities. Others have
complained that there is not enough protection for the brand
5
pharmaceutical companies or patents, that generic companies are
being pummeled with repetitive litigation thereby delaying generic
6
drug entry, or that generic drug companies are not enjoying (or
unduly enjoying) 180-day market exclusivities. Though the Hatch-

Waxman Amendments.”); see also Frank R. Lichtenberg & Joel Waldfogel, Does
Misery Love Company? Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets Before and After the Orphan
Drug Act, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 335, 348 (2009) (suggesting that the
Orphan Drug program “works” well).
3. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990) (“No
interpretation we have been able to imagine can transform § 271(e)(1) into an
elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship.”).
4. For example, in the product liability tort realm, branded drug companies
are treated differently under state tort law than generic drug companies. This, it is
argued, is unfair and plaintiffs have attempted to recover from brand companies
for the injuries caused by generic companies. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz et al.,
Warning: Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-Name Medicines When the Harm
Was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs Has Severe Side Effects, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1835
(2013); see also Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA
Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399 (2013) (discussing how to
allow market exclusivities over genetic material instead of patent rights).
5. See Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 248
(2012) (“The Act fails to strike the right balance between these two sectors of the
industry. It overshoots the mark in terms of fostering generic market entry while
simultaneously undershooting the mark in terms of protecting brand-name
pharma’s incentives to develop new drugs. Even after Hatch-Waxman’s attempt to
restore patent duration to its full-expected term, the average effective life of a
pharmaceutical patent is still shorter than that for any other type of patent.”).
6. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO
PATENT EXPIRATION 39 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default
/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study
/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf (discussing consequences of repetitive litigations in
generic drug patent infringement cases).
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Waxman Act governs medical devices and pharmaceuticals, this
paper only deals with the Act in relation to drugs.
Because of various courts’ policy-driven considerations,
combined with studies by independent (or biased) scholars, plus
interpretations by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as it
related to drug approvals, Congress has stepped in a few times to
legislate again. For example, in 1997 Congress passed the FDA
Modernization Act (FDAMA), which permitted collection of
7
certain user fees to expedite the drug approval process. It also
8
allowed for disseminating studies in an off-label manner. But, in
the world of brand-drug–generic-drug approval and patent
litigation, FDAMA did not do much. In 2002, a small change
occurred that reauthorized the six-month pediatric exclusivity for
brand pharmaceuticals, irrespective of whether the brand drug had
demonstrated clinical pediatric efficacy. The most sweeping
change, if it can be called that, was the 2003 Medicare
9
Modernization Act (MMA).
10
Unlike the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, which
was intended to—and did in fact—effect a wholesale change to
American patent laws, the MMA sought to change certain aspects
of the regulation of brand and generic drugs. It succeeded in part
and failed in part. The MMA did little to deprive lawyers of their
full employment as the fights over drug approvals simply shifted
from one underlying basis to another.
7. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296.
8. See id. § 401. This provision ultimately expired on September 30, 2006.
21 U.S.C. § 360aaa. It allowed certain off-label distribution. The act allowed
manufacturers to distribute copies of peer-reviewed articles and book chapters and
to sponsor independent continuing medical education programs describing uses
of products beyond the approved indications. The FDA recently updated its
guidance on how off-label distribution of truthful materials can be accomplished.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DOCKET NO. FDA-2008-D-0053, FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL
ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW
USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2008),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480e6
d838&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf.
9. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
10. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011). The America Invents Act (AIA) is the most comprehensive update to the
patent laws since the 1952 Act.
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It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss each provision
of the original Hatch-Waxman Act, its problems, and any solutions.
Rather, this article will discuss certain provisions that were
problematic, were (or were not) addressed, and whether the
proposed remedy fixed the problems.
II. A BRIEF BACKGROUND TO THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
In the pre-1984 era of drug approvals, generic-drug
manufacturers needed to await patent expiry before even
beginning generic-drug development. This was because any early
development (defined basically as pre-patent expiry) using the
active ingredient would qualify as patent infringement. Genericdrug developers could start development only after a relevant
patent expired. Because it took a few years to develop a generic
version of the drug, and then a few years to obtain FDA approval,
11
this delay led to a de facto patent extension. Public policy dictated
that when a patent expired, the generic drug would be available
12
soon thereafter. Similarly, for brand companies, because the FDA

11. Proveris Scientific Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., 536 F.3d 1256, 1261 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (“The second distortion was the de facto extension of
effective patent life at the end of the patent term, which also resulted from FDA
premarket approval requirements. Prior to the Hatch–Waxman Act, competitors’
activities involving a patented invention during the patent term constituted an act
of infringement, even if undertaken for the sole purpose of obtaining FDA
regulatory approval. Because such activities could not begin until patent
expiration, patent owners enjoyed a de facto patent term extension while
competitors spent time following patent expiration obtaining FDA premarket
approval necessary for market entry.”); Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co.,
733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Bolar argues that the patent laws are
intended to grant to inventors only a limited 17-year property right to their
inventions so that the public can enjoy the benefits of competition as soon as
possible, consistent with the need to encourage invention. The [Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA)], Bolar contends, was only intended to assure safe and
effective drugs for the public, and not to extend a pharmaceutical company’s
monopoly for an indefinite and substantial period of time while the FDA considers
whether to grant a pre-marketing clearance. Because the FDCA affected prevailing
law, namely the Patent Act, Bolar argues that we should apply the patent laws to
drugs differently.”), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
12. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964) (“Finally,
and especially relevant here, when the patent expires the monopoly created by it
expires, too, and the right to make the article-including the right to make it in
precisely the shape it carried when patented-passes to the public.”); Scott Paper
Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945) (“As has been many times
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maintained jurisdiction to approve drugs prior to commercial
marketing, a brand company could not market the drug until it
obtained that approval. Because the approval process could take a
few years, any underlying patent term would continue to run even
though the brand company could not commercially capitalize on
the patent. Public policy dictated that brand companies recover
some of the time spent pushing an FDA drug application through
approval. In the pharmaceutical world, usually the latter term of
the patent is more valuable because of market dynamics. In the
electronics world, usually only the initial term of the patent is
13
important because of the rapid advancements made.
The 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act sought to reconcile these public
policy considerations. First, Title II of the Act regulated the branddrug approval process and provided for patent term extension.
This title recaptured some time lost due to FDA entanglements,
which was added to the end of the patent, thereby extending its
14
term. Second, Title I of the Act regulated generic-drug
development. This title created the generic-drug approval process,
pointed out, the means adopted by Congress of promoting the progress of science
and the arts is the limited grant of the patent monopoly in return for the full
disclosure of the patented invention and its dedication to the public on the
expiration of the patent.”).
13. For example, in 2013 would anyone really care if the original 386
computer chip is still patented when no computer nowadays uses a 386 chip? So
any remaining patent term on the 386 chip was likely rendered inconsequential
when the 486 and Pentium chips were developed. On the other hand, on the day
before the Lipitor patent expired, the value of the Lipitor drug was several billion
dollars. See PFIZER, 2013 FINANCIAL REPORT, app. A, at 4, available at
http://www.pfizer.com/files/investors/presentations/FinancialReport2013.pdf
(“Lipitor has lost exclusivity in all major markets. Lipitor revenues were
$2.3 billion in 2013, $3.9 billion in 2012 and $9.6 billion in 2011. We lost
exclusivity for Lipitor in the U.S. in November 2011. The entry of multi-source
generic competition in the U.S. began in May 2012, with attendant increased
competitive pressures. Lipitor lost exclusivity in Japan in June 2011, Australia in
April 2012 and most of developed Europe in March and May 2012 and now faces
multi-source generic competition in those markets.”).
14. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1546–47 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“In
exchange, the Hatch–Waxman Act provides the holders of patents on approved
patented products with an extended term of protection under the patent to
compensate for the delay in obtaining FDA approval. This restoration period does
not recover the full time lost from the patent term due to FDA’s premarket
approval process but merely ‘ameliorates the loss incurred when patent terms tick
away while the patented product is awaiting [FDA’s] regulatory approval for
marketing.”).
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the Orange Book patent listing rules and Paragraph I–IV
certification system, the litigation system, and also the 180-day
exclusivity incentive for generic companies to step up and
15
challenge patents. By creating the generic-drug pathway, generic
companies could “early work” any relevant patent under a safe
harbor exemption so development could occur pre-patent expiry
16
and hence facilitate early entry. Because of the serious nature of
brand-versus-generic patent litigation and the rewards for both
parties to game the system, the Act became litigation fodder.
The original Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in 1984. 2014 will
be its thirtieth anniversary. Part III of this paper discusses the
background to the brand and generic drug approval process.
Part IV discusses the problem related to delaying generic-drug
entry via repetitive litigation on repetitive patents. This is normally
known as the thirty-month stay evergreening. Parts V through VIII
discuss the problem related to the so-called 180-day exclusivity and
its forfeiture. Parts IX through XI discuss the problems related to
the patents at issue in lawsuits, and more specifically, which patents
should be part of the Hatch Waxman lawsuit. Parts XII and XIII
discuss the issues relating to the so-called “authorized generic”
(AGx) and whether the AGx is a good or bad thing. And finally,
Part XIV discusses the issues related to inducement to infringe as it
relates to Hatch Waxman suits and the judicial nullification of the
mens rea requirements.
III. BACKGROUND ON THE BRAND AND GENERIC DRUG APPROVAL
PROCESS
The mechanics related to the brand drug approval process is
beyond the scope of this article. The author presumes some
17
familiarity with it. When the brand company’s new drug
application (NDA) is approved, the brand company is obligated to

15. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Royce Labs., Inc., 69 F.3d 1130, 1131 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
16. Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(discussing how the Hatch-Waxman Act legislatively overruled Roche Products, Inc.
v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see also 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1) (2006); SHASHANK UPADHYE, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT AND
FDA LAW §§ 9:1–:12 (2013).
17. For a more complete discussion about the brand drug approval process,
see UPADHYE, supra note 16, §§ 6:1–:22.
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18

list certain patents in the Orange Book. Not all kinds of patents
are listed; rather, only patents claiming certain physical aspects
(such as compound, formulation, or polymorphs) or FDA
19
approved methods of using the drug may be listed. Patents
20
claiming metabolites, processes of making the drug substance or
21
22
drug product, and unapproved uses of the drug are not listed.
The Orange Book listing of patents, therefore, puts the generic
company on notice as to what patents might be implicated by the
23
generic version. A generic company also has to worry about non–
18. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(G) (2012); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo
Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012) (“To facilitate the approval of generic
drugs as soon as patents allow, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments and FDA
regulations direct brand manufacturers to file information about their patents.
The statute mandates that a brand submit in its NDA ‘the patent number and the
expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which the [brand]
submitted the [NDA] or which claims a method of using such drug.’”).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1) (2013); see also UPADHYE,
supra note 16, § 6:10 (providing a chart of listable and non-listable patents).
20. The drug substance is the actual medicinal compound, also known as the
active pharmaceutical ingredient (API). 21 C.F.R. § 314.3.
21. The drug product is the dosage form containing the drug substance, for
example, the pill, tablet, capsule, injection solution, etc. 21 C.F.R. § 314.3.
22. The FDA regulates how the drug product can be marketed to patients.
An approved method of use means the FDA determined that the drug is safe and
efficacious to treat a specific disease condition. Bayer Schering Pharma AG v.
Lupin, Ltd., 676 F.3d 1316, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The FDA-approved label for
an approved drug indicates whether the FDA has approved a particular method of
use for that drug.”). An unapproved use means the FDA has not yet approved the
drug product to treat the disease condition. Cook v. Food & Drug Admin.,
733 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“A drug is misbranded if, among other things, it
was ‘manufactured, prepared, propagated, compounded, or processed in an
establishment not duly registered’ with the FDA. An unapproved new drug is one
that is neither ‘generally recognized, among experts . . . as safe and effective’ for
its labeled use, nor approved by the FDA as safe and effective for its proposed
use.”). While a drug company many promote the use of the drug for approved
uses only, physicians may prescribe the drug for approved and unapproved (also
known as off-label) uses. Accordingly, it may be that the drug is used
predominantly for off-label uses, but no drug company can actively promote the
off-label use.
23. See Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“As the statute requires, Danbury, on March 26, 1997, sent
Yamanouchi a Patent Certification Notice Letter. This certification letter informed
Yamanouchi of Danbury’s paragraph IV ANDA filing. Accompanying the
certification letter were affidavits from Drs. Bernard Loev and John K. Siepler
supporting Danbury’s invalidity certification. The Notice Letter contained, as the
statute requires, an analysis of the prior art and the reasons for the asserted
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Orange Book patents, as those patents could also be implicated by
24
the commercial launch of the generic version. Finally, a generic
company may worry about patents held by third parties to the
25
extent that they too are implicated by the commercial launch.
The scope of patents is pictorially shown.

Figure 1: Scope of Patents

To obtain final approval of the generic drug application, the
generic drug company must, in its abbreviated new drug
application (ANDA), certify to the listed Orange Book patents.
There are four types of patent certifications that the company may
26
file:
invalidity.”).
24. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 807, 846 (N.D. Ill. 2007),
aff’d, 544 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (granting an injunction on non–Orange Book
patents as, at the time, antibiotic related patents could not be listed in the Orange
Book).
25. See id. Post-generic-launch patent litigation can occur where the brand
company sues the launching generic company. This occurred in the
clarithromycin XL (Biaxin XL) case. Id. Additionally, one generic company may
sue another generic company for infringement. See, e.g., Apotex, Inc. v. Eon Labs
Inc., Nos. 01-CV-0482, 02-CV-1604, 2007 WL 656256 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007),
vacated, Nos. 01-CV-0482(NG), 02-CV-1604, 2007 WL 8097571 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15,
2007) (cyclosporine); Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Teva Pharm. Indus. v.
Andrx Corp., No. 2:07-cv-00244 (D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2007) (polymorphs of sertraline).
26. The patent certification language is differently stated, but this list is more

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

9

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 4

1316

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:4





Paragraph I—there are no patents in the Orange Book
Paragraph II—the patent has expired
Paragraph III—the patent has not yet expired and final
approval should be delayed until the patent has expired; or
 Paragraph IV—the patent has not yet expired but is not an
obstacle to final approval, and as such, final approval should
27
be given when the ANDA is normally approvable.
If the generic company believes the patent to be an obstacle or
otherwise does not wish to challenge a patent yet, it may file the
28
Paragraph III certification. This means that the ANDA can be
filed and put into the FDA review queue, but the final approval will
not come until that patent expires. The Paragraph IV certification
29
instead generates subsequent patent litigation. If the generic
company believes a patent is not an obstacle to the final ANDA
approval, the Paragraph IV certification to that patent is the
30
appropriate certification.
Once the ANDA containing a Paragraph IV certification is
filed, the generic drug company then will send a so-called
Paragraph IV notice letter to the brand company informing it that
the generic company has filed an ANDA against the brand drug
version and explaining in great detail the basis why the patent
31
certified against is not an obstacle to final approval. That is, the
in plain English.
27. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV) (2012); see also Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v.
Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.,
496 U.S. 661, 677 (1990).
28. Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676 (“When no patents are listed in the Orange
Book or all listed patents have expired (or will expire prior to the ANDA’s
approval), the generic manufacturer simply certifies to that effect.”); Dey Pharma,
L.P. v. Sunovion Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d 1158, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“A generic
company may then seek FDA approval using an abbreviated new drug application
(‘ANDA’) with a certification for each patent in the Orange Book, such as
a ‘paragraph III certification’ (that approval is not sought until the patent
expires) . . . .”).
29. Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677 (“Filing a paragraph IV certification means
provoking litigation.”).
30. Id. (“The generic manufacturer’s second option is to file a so-called
paragraph IV certification, which states that a listed patent ‘is invalid or will not be
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the [generic] drug.’”) (alteration in
original) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV)).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B); see also Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Lupin,
Ltd., 676 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest
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notice letter will explain the bases for noninfringement and/or
32
invalidity of the patent. Upon receipt of the notice letter, the
brand company can evaluate the allegations contained therein and
may choose to sue the generic company. If the brand company sues
within forty-five days of receipt of the notice letter, the brand
company obtains a thirty-month stay (injunction) of any ANDA
33
final approval. During this period, the FDA is enjoined from
approving the ANDA. The purpose of this thirty-month litigation
34
stay is to vet out the patent issues in the underlying litigation. The
thirty-month litigation stay can be terminated early if the generic
35
company wins its lawsuit. When the stay expires, the FDA may
grant final ANDA approval (subject to meeting the normal
regulatory requirements) permitting the generic company to
36
launch its generic version, subject to any other legal impediments.
The generic company need not await a trial court verdict in the
patent infringement case.
The generic company has twin motivations in filing an ANDA
with a Paragraph IV certification. First, if the company believes that
the patent is not an obstacle, then it behooves the company to
challenge the patent and “clear the way” for its product. By
challenging and possibly litigating the patent, it allows the
company to enter the marketplace free from liability for patent
infringement. A second motivation is to garner the so-called 180day exclusivity. The 180-day exclusivity is said to be an incentive to
challenge patents and bring generic versions to the market as early
Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“All Paragraph IV ANDA filers
must provide notice of their Paragraph IV certification to both the patent owner
and the NDA holder. This notice must set forth a ‘detailed statement of the factual
and legal basis for the opinion of the applicant that the patent is invalid or will not
be infringed.’” (citations omitted)).
32. Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 724, 728 (N.D. Ill.
2010) (describing the Paragraph IV notice letter and the arguments contained
therein).
33. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013).
34. Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677 (“Assuming the brand does so, the FDA
generally may not approve the ANDA until 30 months pass or the court finds the
patent invalid or not infringed.”). There are instances where a thirty-month stay is
not applicable. See UPADHYE, supra note 16, §§ 11:3, :21; infra Part IV.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)–(IV).
36. See, e.g., Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., Civ.
Nos. 09-184-LPS, 10-892-LPS, 2012 WL 1901267 (D. Del. May 25, 2012) (enjoining
generic company prior to launch).
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37

as possible. If the ANDA applicant is the first generic company to
file a Paragraph IV certification to a drug product, that applicant
may obtain 180 days of market exclusivity that delays subsequent
38
ANDA’s from obtaining final approval.
The economics of the 180-day exclusivity makes a good deal of
sense, and it is extremely profitable. For example, assume that the
brand drug product is worth $1 billion dollars per year. Because of
automatic substitution laws that require a pharmacy to substitute a
generic version when available, upon launch the generic company
will capture a huge percent of the prescription market. Because of
limited competition, the generic drug company can price its
version relatively high, but considerably lower than the brand drug.
If we assume that 80% of the market converts and the generic
version is priced at 80% of the brand drug, then the 180-day
39
exclusivity is worth about $320 million. Once the market becomes
wide open genericized (say after day 181), then the price and
market share plummet. For the remainder of the year, the first
40
ANDA company may only make $50 million dollars. Thereafter,
more companies will enter the market and the price and market
37. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228–29 (“Hatch-Waxman provides a special
incentive for a generic to be the first to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application
taking the paragraph IV route. That applicant will enjoy a period of 180 days of
exclusivity (from the first commercial marketing of its drug).”); Janssen
Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“As an
incentive for generic pharmaceutical companies to challenge suspect Orange
Book listed patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act grants the first company to submit a
Paragraph IV ANDA a 180-day period of generic marketing exclusivity during
which time FDA will not approve a later-filed Paragraph IV ANDA based on the
same NDA . . . .”).
38. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229; see also 21 USC § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (“Subject
to subparagraph (D), if the application contains a certification described in
paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV) and is for a drug for which a first applicant has
submitted an application containing such a certification, the application shall be
made effective on the date that is 180 days after the date of the first commercial
marketing of the drug (including the commercial marketing of the listed drug) by
any first applicant.”).
39. The calculation is roughly $2.8 million per day ($1 billion per year),
multiplied by 80% (market conversion), multiplied by 80% (price), multiplied by
180 days, equals $320 million.
40. Assume in open competition that the price now plummets to 10% and
each company takes only a 10% share. Accordingly, the calculation becomes
$2.8 million per day, multiplied by 10%, multiplied by 10%, multiplied by a half
year, equals $50 million. It is not uncommon, though, for price to plummet to
only 2–5% with even less market share, resulting in even less money.
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share will plummet even further. Because most brand drug
products are not billion-dollar plus, rather worth only a few
hundred million, generic companies may make only a few million
in sales per drug product. The drastic price and market erosion,
though, benefits the consumers as their drug prices are reduced.
Accordingly, it makes sense for generic drug companies to
challenge patents, win the lawsuits, enter the market, and try to
capitalize on the 180-day exclusivity. For brand companies, it makes
sense to litigate as much as possible, make the litigation as
expensive and complex as possible, delay the litigation as much as
possible, and delay ANDA approval as long as possible.
IV. REPETITIVE THIRTY-MONTH STAYS AND EVERGREENING PATENTS
The original 1984 Act created the regime for patent litigation
to be vetted out during the thirty-month litigation stay. However,
between 1984 and 2003 the thirty-month litigation stay was patent41
by-patent specific. For a pending ANDA to obtain final approval,
the ANDA must have addressed each patent listed in the Orange
42
Book with a relevant patent certification. Accordingly, each time a
new patent was listed in the Orange Book, any pending ANDA
would require a patent certification to that new pop-up patent to
43
obtain final approval. If the ANDA applicant certified under
Paragraph IV and timely notified the brand company of the
certification via the required notice letter, then a timely filed new
patent suit on that pop-up patent could earn a new thirty-month
44
litigation stay.
41. Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(“SmithKline filed each of those actions within 45 days of receiving notice of the
relevant paragraph IV certification by Apotex. The FDA treated each lawsuit as
giving rise to an additional 30–month stay of the approval of Apotex’s ANDA.”); see
also Food & Drug Admin., Response to American Pharmaceutical Partners, Inc.
and Pharmachemie B.V. Citizen Petitions, No. 99P-1271/PSA1 & PSA2 (Aug. 2,
1999), http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/080699/pdn0001.pdf.
42. 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(i) (2013); see also Letter from Food & Drug
Admin. to Applicant Regarding Topiramate Sprinkle Capsules (Apr. 15, 2009),
available at http://op.bna.com/hl.nsf/id/deln-7rcpgj/$File/Topiramateletter415
.doc.pdf. (“[U]nder the pre-MMA approach, an applicant could be eligible for
180-day exclusivity with respect to different patents (‘patent-by-patent’ exclusivity),
including with respect to patent certifications to different patents submitted on
different days.”).
43. Apotex, 347 F.3d at 1340.
44. See, e.g., Frederick Tong, Widening the Bottleneck of Pharmaceutical Patent
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Accordingly, one could clearly game the system by having new
patents issue that may (or may not) claim the underlying drug
product, list them, and subsequently earn new thirty-month
litigation stays. This could delay the ANDA final approval for years
beyond the original thirty-month litigation stay expiration date. In
the 1984–2003 era, there were few penalties for frivolous pop-up
45
patent listings. As such, one could evergreen new patents and
46
evergreen the thirty-month litigation stays. The Federal Trade
Commission took note of the problem and recommended
47
changes.
When Congress passed the MMA in 2003, the concept of
48
stacking thirty-month litigation stays was stopped. Now, the only
universe of patents that qualify for thirty-month stays is the patents
49
listed in the Orange Book on the day the ANDA is filed. One can
think of this as “freezing” the Orange Book of the patent listing. Of
course, different ANDA applicants could be subject to different
thirty-month litigation stays by virtue of the ANDA filing dates. For
Exclusivity, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 775, 788 (2003); see also Apotex, 347 F.3d at 1340
(“The FDA required Apotex to file certifications for the newly listed patents, and
Apotex filed paragraph IV certifications for each of them. SmithKline
subsequently sued Apotex in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania on September 27, 2000, charging infringement of the ′759
patent; on January 11, 2001, charging infringement of the ′944 patent; and on
May 2, 2001, charging infringement of the ′233 patent. SmithKline filed each of
those actions within 45 days of receiving notice of the relevant paragraph IV
certification by Apotex. The FDA treated each lawsuit as giving rise to an
additional 30–month stay of the approval of Apotex’s ANDA.”).
45. Courts have suggested that the filing of an ANDA is a statutory act of
infringement and that the statute specifically allows a brand company to sue and
earn a thirty-month stay. Accordingly, there is no Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 violation for a brand company in filing suit in the first place, and no
investigation into the facts are really needed. Celgene Corp. v. KV Pharm. Co.,
No. 07-4819 (SDW), 2008 WL 2856469 (D.N.J. July 22, 2008). Though once the
lawsuit progresses, the regular rules of Rule 11 ought to apply and those penalties
or sanctions should apply. Accordingly, if the plaintiff recognizes that the
infringement suit cannot be maintained, it should be required to cancel its suit.
46. Wansheng Jerry Liu, Balancing Accessibility and Sustainability: How to
Achieve the Dual Objectives of the Hatch-Waxman Act While Resolving Antitrust Issues in
Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement Cases, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 452 (2008).
47. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 49.
48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012).
49. See UPADHYE, supra note 16, § 11:3; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)
(identifying the patents that qualify for thirty-month litigation stays based on when
an ANDA is filed).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss4/4

14

Upadhye: There's a Hole in My Bucket Dear Liza, Dear Liza: The 30-Year Ann

2014]

HATCH-WAXMAN: RESOLVED & UNRESOLVED GAPS

1321

example, if ANDA applicant #1 filed its ANDA on a certain date,
then only those patents in the Orange Book at that time could
qualify for thirty-month stays. But then if new patents issued that
then were listed into the Orange Book, then applicant #2, who filed
after its ANDA after the new set of patents listed into the Orange
Book, could be subject to different thirty-month litigation stays
based on those newly listed patents because it would have to certify
50
to the newly listed patents.
Even if a patentee cannot get new thirty-month litigation stays
51
on the pop-up patents, it can still sue on those patents. Indeed,
the pop-up patents could be very powerful patents that could block
52
a generic company’s launch. In fact, depending on the litigation
50. See UPADHYE, supra note 16, § 11:3 (discussing the concept of the frozen
Orange Book).
51. See Mylan Labs., v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(“Meanwhile, in October 2001 Mylan filed with the FDA an ANDA to market its
generic fentanyl transdermal system pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) with a
paragraph IV certification that ALZA’s ‘580 patent was invalid or would not be
infringed by Mylan’s marketing of its generic product. As required under
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B), on December 6, 2001, Mylan sent ALZA notice of its
ANDA application and certification which ALZA received on December 10, 2001.
On January 25, 2002, the forty-sixth day after notice was received, ALZA filed a
patent infringement action against Mylan in the United States District Court for
the District of Vermont. Because the action was not brought within the statutory
45-day window following notice receipt, there was no automatic 30-month stay and,
under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), Mylan’s ANDA was to ‘be made effective
immediately.’ Accordingly, on November 21, 2003, the FDA granted final approval
of Mylan’s ANDA.”); see, e.g., Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Leavitt, 484 F. Supp. 2d 109,
115–16 (D.D.C. 2007) (“On May 22, 2002, Mylan filed an ANDA to the FDA for a
generic version of amlodipine besylate. Mylan’s ANDA contained a Paragraph IV
Certification complete with Mylan’s assertion that Pfizer’s 303 Patent was invalid.
Responding to this action, Pfizer initiated a patent infringement lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Though the
filing of this lawsuit by Pfizer would ordinarily have triggered an automatic
30-month stay on approval of Mylan’s ANDA with the FDA, 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), because Pfizer failed to file its lawsuit within 45 days after
receiving notice of Mylan’s Paragraph IV Certification, the statutory 30-month stay
was not triggered . . . .”); Biovail Labs. Int’l SRL v. Impax Labs. Inc., 433 F. Supp.
2d 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006); see also Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., 391 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2004); UPADHYE, supra note 16, § 11:17.
52. Pfizer, Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., No. 02:02CV1628, 2007 WL 654274,
at *35 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2007) (“AND NOW, this 27th day of February, 2007, in
accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, is it
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment in this action is hereby
entered in favor of Pfizer Inc. and against Mylan Laboratories, Inc. and Mylan
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posture in the case, a patentee could seek a traditional preliminary
injunction to block a generic launch upon thirty-month litigation
stay expiry using the pop-up patent and/or use the pop-up patent
53
as the actual basis for liability.
Congress recognized that repetitive thirty-month stays delayed
generic drug entry and cured the problem in the 2003 MMA. Now
the fight over the thirty-month stay involves ancillary litigation on
54
whether to elongate or shorten the thirty-month stay. The statute
provided and still provides for elongation or premature
termination of the stay based on the cooperation of the parties in
55
the litigation. Thus, the MMA fixed a huge problem in the 1984
Act.
V. THE 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY PERIOD AND ITS FORFEITURE
If the 1984 Act can be comically known as the Litigator’s Full
Employment Act, then the 2003 MMA is the Continuing Litigator’s
Full Employment Act. The 180-day exclusivity and related
machinations have caused extensive mischief, morphing well
56
beyond original congressional intent. The 180-day exclusivity was
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. and Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
are hereby permanently enjoined from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or
importing into the United States the Mylan Amlodipine Tablets described in
ANDA No. 76-418 until after the expiration of Pfizer’s ‘303 patent term, as
extended by the pediatric exclusivity period.”), rev’d, 236 Fed. App’x 608 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
53. See Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., Civ.
Nos. 09-84-LPS, 10-892-LPS, 2012 WL 1901267 (D. Del. May 25, 2012) (finding no
liability on the original Paragraph IV patents, the court enjoined the generic
company based on the Chang 532 pop-up patent).
54. See UPADHYE, supra note 16, § 11:13 (discussing cases that extend the
thirty-month stay), 11:15 (discussing cases that shorten the thirty-month stay).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012) (“If such an action is brought before
the expiration of such days, the approval shall be made effective upon the
expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the date of the receipt of the
notice provided under paragraph (2)(B)(i) or such shorter or longer period as
the court may order because either party to the action failed to reasonably
cooperate in expediting the action.”).
56. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 587 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4
(D.D.C. 2008) (“Entitlement to the 180-day exclusivity period can be forfeited,
however, if a first ANDA-applicant fails to market the drug within a specified time
period. Congress enacted the forfeiture provisions to ‘ensure that the 180-day
exclusivity period enjoyed by the first generic to challenge a patent cannot be used
as a bottleneck to prevent additional generic competition.’” (citations omitted));
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originally designed to provide an incentive (not a vested property
right) to generic companies to step up to challenge Orange Book
57
patents and bring products to the market early. To understand
why the situation is still problematic, we need to understand what
the 180-day exclusivity is and why it matters.
First, economically, the amount of money in play is enormous.
Obviously, for larger branded drugs the value of the 180-day
exclusivity to the generic company is large and for smaller drugs
the value proposition is less. The 1984 Act did not expressly
provide for an outright 180-day exclusivity; rather, it was created as
a function of subsequent ANDA filers. The 180-day exclusivity is
created only when a second ANDA applicant files an ANDA with
58
the relevant Paragraph IV certifications. In other words, the first
ANDA filer (with the Paragraph IV certification) receives only a
180-day exclusivity when a second ANDA filer (with the same
Paragraph IV certification) files. Without a second ANDA filer

149 CONG. REC. S16104, 16105-06 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch) (“This is good for the consumer and sound policy since the rationale
behind the 180-day provision is to create an incentive for challenges to the
pioneer’s patents, not to create an entitlement to the first applicant to file a patent
challenge with the FDA in the Parklawn Building.”).
57. Compare Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Leavitt, 548 F.3d 103, 107 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (“Unfortunately for Teva, an ANDA applicant’s right to a period of
marketing exclusivity does not vest merely because a paragraph IV certification is
filed.”), with Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1318 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (“Finally, the FDA’s sole effort to root its interpretation in the policy
underlying Hatch-Waxman—the thought that the interpretation benefits
consumers by allowing full generic competition without a 180-day delay—betrays a
misunderstanding of the exclusivity incentive. The statute’s grant of a 180-day
delay in multiple generic competition for the first successful paragraph IV filer is a
pro-consumer device. And it happens to be precisely the device Congress has
chosen to induce challenges to patents claimed to support brand drugs. The
statute thus deliberately sacrifices the benefits of full generic competition at the
first chance allowed by the brand manufacturer’s patents, in favor of the benefits
of earlier generic competition, brought about by the promise of a reward for
generics that stick out their necks (at the potential cost of a patent infringement
suit) by claiming that patent law does not extend the brand maker’s monopoly as
long as the brand maker has asserted. As Congress deliberately created the 180-day
exclusivity bonus, the FDA cannot justify its interpretation by proudly proclaiming
that it has eviscerated that bonus.”).
58. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (discussing how a second application
with a Paragraph IV certification will be held behind a first applicant that has
submitted an application containing a Paragraph IV certification).
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(with the Paragraph IV certifications), the first filer will not receive
the statutory 180-day exclusivity period:
Subject to subparagraph (D), if the application contains a
certification described in paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV) and is
for a drug for which a first applicant has submitted an
application containing such a certification, the application shall be made effective on the date that is 180 days
after the date of the first commercial marketing of the
drug (including the commercial marketing of the listed
59
drug) by any first applicant.
The statute designs the 180-day exclusivity to be the inverse of
an outright grant of exclusivity. Yet too often parties argue that it is
a vested property right, even though the D.C. Circuit has held that
60
it is not a vested property right. If it were an outright grant of
immutable property, the 1984 statute and subsequent amendments
61
would have so stated. Congress is presumed to legislate knowing
the underlying state of the law. Congress was fully aware that fights
over the 180-day exclusivity existed but chose not to grant it
62
outright. Instead, the reverse happened.
VI. CONGRESS EXPLICITLY CREATES VEHICLES TO STRIP EXCLUSIVITY
In the MMA of 2003, Congress legislated to extinguish the 180day exclusivity. Congress recognized that parties were “bottlenecking” or “parking” the exclusivity so that subsequent ANDA
63
filers were blocked. In response, Congress created not just

59. Id.
60. Leavitt, 548 F.3d at 107; see also UPADHYE, supra note 16, § 13:2.
61. C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug
Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 969–70 (2011)
(suggesting that exclusivity should be earned).
62. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009) (“We cannot
ignore Congress’ decision to amend Title VII’s relevant provisions but not make
similar changes to the ADEA. When Congress amends one statutory provision but
not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.”). In creating the
forfeiture provisions, Congress touched that section of the Hatch-Waxman Act,
touched the 180-day exclusivity provision, and yet still left the provision as a
function of an inverse grant.
63. Erika King Lietzan, A Brief History of 180-Day Exclusivity Under the HatchWaxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 287, 314 (2004) (citing 149 CONG. REC. S15,746 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Charles Schumer)); see also 149 CONG. REC. S15,761 (daily ed.
Nov. 24, 2003) (statement of Sen. William Frist).
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one, but six different forfeiture buckets in the MMA to strip the
64
180-day exclusivity from the first ANDA filer. Congress enacted
65
these six forfeiture buckets in one section. Legislative history also
confirms that congressional intent was to deprive the first filer of its
66
180-day exclusivity as soon as possible. It is important to
differentiate between a forfeiture of the exclusivity versus a trigger
of the exclusivity. A forfeiture is a binary event that can only occur
67
if the exclusivity exists. A trigger, though, starts the 180-day clock.
Congress did not do the best job in drafting the relevant MMA
provisions. Yet clever parties have been successful in perverting the
statute even more and twisting it beyond its intended purpose by
68
arguing that forfeiture ought not to apply in certain situations.
69
Courts, regrettably, have agreed. We can examine a few of these
70
perversions and acceptable outcomes.
64. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i) (2012); Hi-Tech Pharm. Co. v. U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., 587 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Entitlement to the 180-day
exclusivity period can be forfeited, however, if a first ANDA-applicant fails to
market the drug within a specified time period. Congress enacted the forfeiture
provisions to ‘ensure that the 180-day exclusivity period enjoyed by the first
generic to challenge a patent cannot be used as a bottleneck to prevent additional
generic competition.’”).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i).
66. 149 CONG. REC. S16,104, 16,105-06 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Orrin Hatch).
67. 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(D)(i).
68. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D.D.C. 2009),
rev’d, 595 F.3d 1303 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug
Admin. (Hi-Tech II), 587 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing effect of
delisting patents); Granisetron Hydrochloride Injection and 180-day Generic Drug
Exclusivity, FDA Docket No.: 2007N-0389 (Jan. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/07n0389/07n-0389-let0003.pdf;
Ramipril Capsules and 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, FDA Docket No.: 2007N0382 (Jan. 29, 2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets
/07n0382/07n-0382-let6.pdf.
69. Teva, 638 F. Supp. 2d 42; Mylan Labs. Ltd. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
910 F. Supp. 2d 299, 314 (D.D.C. 2012) (“The administrative record on Ranbaxy’s
failure to obtain tentative approval within 30 months is complete. Both FDA and
Ranbaxy have filed summary judgment motions that are fully briefed. For the
reasons stated in Part I.A., the Court concludes that, as a matter of law, FDA’s
September 28, 2012 no-forfeiture decision is supported by the administrative
record and is not ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.’ Hence, summary judgment in favor of FDA and Ranbaxy is
appropriate and will be entered.” (citations omitted)).
70. As a side note, despite a generic company’s reverence to the 180-day
exclusivity as a reward for which no generic drug development would have
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An area that does work is the so-called “failure to obtain
71
tentative approval” bucket. Recall that in the pre-MMA regime, a
party could file a shoddy ANDA just to secure the 180-day
72
exclusivity status. Given the ANDA application’s poor quality, it
could take years to obtain final ANDA approval. If the 180-day
exclusivity was triggered only by a commercial launch or a court
decision, then assuming that no court decision came, the launch
was the only trigger. A poor-quality ANDA would not timely obtain
final launch approval, preventing any other generic version of the
same drug from entering the market. In the 2003 MMA, Congress
recognized this and enacted this “failure to obtain tentative
73
approval” bucket. Based on the ANDA filing date, the first ANDA
applicant would have only thirty months to obtain tentative (or
74
final, if relevant) approval.
The effect of this provision is that first ANDA filers must now
submit a quality ANDA that has the best chance of moving through
the review system within thirty months of its filing date. Otherwise,
the first ANDA filer will forfeit its exclusivity. Due to FDA review
backlogs, though, the average pendency of ANDA reviews was
75
about thirty-three to thirty-four months, so a lot of first ANDA
filers forfeited the 180-day exclusivity through no fault of their own.
In challenging the forfeitures, many applicants complained that it
was not the poor quality of the ANDA that caused long review
periods; rather, it was the FDA review queue workload. That is, the
delays in obtaining tentative approval in time were due to volume
of work at the FDA, not due to ANDA quality issues. The FDA
defended that the statute provided a thirty-month window, and if
applicants were so concerned, then the remedy lay with Congress.
occurred but for its existence, it is interesting to note that no other country in the
world has a generic drug exclusivity, even those countries that have a vibrant
generic drug development program and marketing. This is further evidence that
the 180-day exclusivity is a windfall when it happens, but is not a necessary
predicate to generic drug development.
71. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV) (2012).
72. See, e.g., Nostrum Pharm., L.L.C. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., No. 113111(JAP), 2011 WL 2652147, at *2–3 (D.N.J. July 6, 2011) (stating that the ANDA
was filed in March 2003 but not approved until May 2011, some 8 years and
2 months later).
73. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV).
74. See id.
75. Derrick Gingery, ANDA Application Backlogs, Submission Bubbles Plague User
Fee Rollout, PINK SHEET, Feb. 17, 2014, at 1.
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Congress heard and acted. In the recent Food and Drug
Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 (FDASIA),
Congress enacted temporary stopgap measures to help ANDA
applicants retain the 180-day exclusivity due to FDA review
76
backlogs. In addition, Congress authorized the Generic Drug User
Fee Act (GDUFA) to allow the FDA to collect filing fees from
ANDA applicants, the money from which is used to help reduce
77
the backlog. Under the FDASIA amendment, the previous
thirty-month clock to obtain approval is now temporarily extended
to forty months until September 30, 2015, and then is reduced to
thirty-six months until September 30, 2016, then back to thirty
78
months. The combination of the extension of time and the
GDUFA fees should allow ANDA applicants to meet the thirty,
thirty-six, and forty month deadlines.
Accordingly, Congress stepped in twice to fix the problems.
First, the MMA created the tentative approval in a thirty-month
window to force the filing of higher quality ANDAs. Second, when
the backlog became great, Congress extended the tentative
approval window to forty months. So, when Congress knew that
ANDA sponsors were fighting over the 180-day exclusivity, Congress
still chose not to grant the exclusivity outright. While it can be
suggested that Congress now agrees with the underlying case law
precedent on the matter (and hence felt no need to codify it),
equally, the status of the 180-day exclusivity remains in dispute. But
we can safely state that recognizing that the thirty-month window to
obtain tentative approval was not working under the modern
realities and Congress, rather than courts or the FDA, stepped in to
legislate a correction to the 1984 Act. Therefore, this part of the
overall system works.
VII. THE FAILURE TO MARKET—A PERVERSION OF A PROVISION
Most of the perversions in the MMA, however, exist in the first
79
forfeiture bucket; namely, the failure-to-market bucket. This
forfeiture bucket, in principle, is supposed to ensure that if the first

76. Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L.
No. 112–144, § 1133, 126 Stat. 993, 1122 (2012).
77. Id. § 744B, 126 Stat. at 1011.
78. Id. § 1133, 126 Stat. at 1122 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(IV)); see also UPADHYE, supra note 16, § 14:15.70.
79. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2012).
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ANDA filer can launch the product without incurring patent
liability, then it should do so. The provision is designed to prevent
the 180-day exclusivity from being parked. To understand why this
forfeiture bucket is problematic, it is important to examine the
statutory structure, which is as follows:
(i) Definition of forfeiture event.—In this subparagraph, the term “forfeiture event”, with respect to an
application under this subsection, means the occurrence
of any of the following:
(I) Failure to market.—The first applicant fails to
market the drug by the later of—
(aa) the earlier of the date that is—
(AA) 75 days after the date on which the
approval of the application of the first applicant
is made effective under subparagraph (B)(iii); or
(BB) 30 months after the date of submission
of the application of the first applicant; or
(bb) with respect to the first applicant or any
other applicant (which other applicant has received
tentative approval), the date that is 75 days after the
date as of which, as to each of the patents with
respect to which the first applicant submitted and
lawfully maintained a certification qualifying the
first applicant for the 180-day exclusivity period
under subparagraph (B)(iv), at least 1 of the
following has occurred:
(AA) In an infringement action brought
against that applicant with respect to the patent
or in a declaratory judgment action brought by
that applicant with respect to the patent, a court
enters a final decision from which no appeal
(other than a petition to the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken that
the patent is invalid or not infringed.
(BB) In an infringement action or a declaratory judgment action described in subitem (AA),
a court signs a settlement order or consent
decree that enters a final judgment that includes
a finding that the patent is invalid or not
infringed.
(CC) The patent information submitted under
subsection (b) or (c) of this section is withdrawn
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by the holder of the application approved under
80
subsection (b) of this section.
The statute requires a comparison of two distinct events to
determine which comes later in time: a “little (aa)” versus a “little
(bb)” event. To determine the dates that apply to the little (aa) or
little (bb) events, one must then drill down to examine the
big (AA), big (BB), and big (CC) dates that may apply. Here is
where the problem lies. Recall that the overall purpose and
structure of the forfeiture statutes are to cause the forfeiture that
will lead to open market competition. The forfeiture buckets are
81
designed to strip any 180-day exclusivity entitlements. Under
little (aa), the underlying dates are easily calculable as these dates
rely mostly on regulatory affairs processes. Little (bb)/big (AA)
and little (bb)/big (BB) are generally related to litigation whereas
little (bb)/big (CC) is not litigation related, but is related to
conduct of the patentee in delisting the patent from the Orange
Book.
In examining the statutory setup regarding the failure to
market provision, the purpose of the little (bb)/big (AA) or
big (BB) provisions is to cause the forfeiture when any litigation
82
exposure has been eliminated. Without those protections, the
180-day exclusivity holder might feel it necessary to launch the
product, with potential risk of exposure, in order to capitalize on
the 180-day exclusivity. The big (AA) and big (BB) provisions help
protect against the potential at-risk launch exposure.
VIII. DELISTING PATENTS AND FORFEITURE—PERVERSIONS OF
PROVISIONS CONTINUE
The little (bb)/big (CC) provision has been wrongly
interpreted by the courts. The plain text of the statute puts no
conditions on how or why the patent information is withdrawn
(that is, the patent is delisted from the Orange Book). All that the
statute requires is simply that the patent information is withdrawn.
80. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i).
81. Id.; Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 587 F. Supp.
2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Entitlement to the 180-day exclusivity period can be
forfeited, however, if a first ANDA-applicant fails to market the drug within a
specified time period. Congress enacted the forfeiture provisions to ‘ensure that
the 180-day exclusivity period enjoyed by the first generic to challenge a patent
cannot be used as a bottleneck to prevent additional generic competition.’”).
82. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i).
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Motives or mechanics on the patent delisting are not relevant.
83
Unfortunately, one court disagreed.
The D.C. Circuit added quite a load of nonstatutory baggage
to the provision. To the court, the proper interpretation of the
provision required that the patent was delisted pursuant to a court
84
order that mandated its delisting. It was not enough that the
patentee simply recognize that the patent was improperly listed and
85
that its delisting was necessary. To the court, litigation was
necessary to obtain a court order requiring the delisting and,
86
without it, the patent could not be delisted voluntarily. The court
relied on the broader policy that the original 1984 Hatch-Waxman
Act created—the 180-day exclusivity for the first filed generic
company—and noted that it would be unfair for a patentee to
87
manipulate that policy by delisting the patent(s) unilaterally.
83. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1315 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
84. Apotex, Inc. v. Sebelius, 384 Fed. App’x 4, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted) (“When the Hatch-Waxman Act’s forfeiture provisions are viewed in the
context of the statute’s incentive structure, it becomes clear that Congress could
not have intended a brand manufacturer’s unilateral decision to cause the
premature expiration of a patent (in the face of a generic applicant’s challenge to
the patent in a paragraph IV certification) to strip the first generic applicant of the
180-day period of marketing exclusivity granted by the statute. We will thus affirm
the district court’s decision to deny appellants’ motions for a preliminary
injunction.”). In the interest of disclosure, I was the Global Head of IP for Apotex,
Inc., who instigated the attempt to forfeit.
85. Teva, 595 F.3d at 1307 (“In response to Teva’s filing, Merck chose not to
sue for infringement, as it might have. Instead, on March 18, 2005, Merck asked
the FDA to delist the 075 patent, which the agency did, though without making
the action public until April 18, 2008.”).
86. Id. at 1317 (“Setting aside the subsection at issue in this case—listed as
(5) above, and codified as (bb)(CC)—the ‘failure to market’ forfeiture provision
does not permit a brand manufacturer to vitiate a generic’s exclusivity without the
generic manufacturer’s having had some say in the matter. No forfeiture can take
place unless the brand manufacturer brings an infringement suit against the
generic and either loses on the merits or enters an unfavorable settlement
agreement. The latter necessarily entails some participation by the generic; the
former invariably involves significant expense for the brand manufacturer, and
affords the victorious generic the opportunity to ask the court to delay entering
final judgment until a date that would not trigger forfeiture prematurely—before
the agency grants final approval to the relevant ANDA.”).
87. Id. at 1318 (“We see nothing in the 2003 amendments to the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act that changes the structure of the statute such that brand
companies should be newly able to delist challenged patents, thereby triggering a
forfeiture event that deprives generic companies of the period of marketing
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88

Of course, that is wrong. First, it is arguable whether the
original 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act created an overall policy to create
89
a vested property right as a reward. Second, even if there was an
original broader policy, the 2003 MMA forfeiture provisions
distinctly narrowed that policy in favor of causing a forfeiture of the
180-day exclusivity. Recall that the MMA created not just one, but
six different provisions, each mutually exclusive, that were expressly
defined to forfeit the 180-day exclusivity. The court stated that
nothing in the MMA changed the overall policy allowing the first
filer to maintain its exclusivity even though the patentee delisted
the patent. Furthermore, by holding that the patent delisting
provision of little (bb)/big (CC) could be invoked only through a
litigation consequence, unilateral delisting would not qualify as a
90
forfeiture. Finally, certain studies indicate that awards of 180-day
exclusivity occurred even when there was no litigation or no real
91
challenges to patents.

exclusivity they otherwise deserve. For that reason, the interpretation of the statute
that the FDA has adopted in two recent adjudications, and that it regards itself as
bound by law to apply to Teva’s ANDAs for losartan products, fails at Chevron step
one.”). For a complete description of the events in the losartan patent delisting
case, its twists and turns, and its wrong conclusion, see UPADHYE, supra note 16,
§ 14:9.
88. Of course I am wrong, because the court decided what it decided and is
deemed correct. I suggest the court is “of course” wrong because I continue to
disagree with its position.
89. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Leavitt, 548 F.3d 103, 107 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(“Unfortunately for Teva, an ANDA applicant’s right to a period of marketing
exclusivity does not vest merely because a paragraph IV certification is filed.”).
90. Teva, 595 F.3d at 1318 (“We see nothing in the 2003 amendments to the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act that changes the structure of the statute such that
brand companies should be newly able to delist challenged patents, thereby
triggering a forfeiture event that deprives generic companies of the period of
marketing exclusivity they otherwise deserve. For that reason, the interpretation of
the statute that the FDA has adopted in two recent adjudications, and that it
regards itself as bound by law to apply to Teva’s ANDAs for losartan products, fails
at Chevron step one.”). This (wrong) holding was reaffirmed in Apotex, 384 Fed.
App’x 4.
91. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 61, at 956–57 (“We found that for most
drugs, the generic drug maker did little or nothing to earn the exclusivity award.
Almost half of the awards (23) are no-suit awards, meaning that the generic firm
didn’t have to spend money on litigation or face uncertainty about the outcome of
the suit. Indeed, in some cases the basis for the award was a patent that was
arguably irrelevant to the product described in the ANDA, in which case little or
no effort was needed to develop a legal or design-around strategy. Another nine
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The court’s litigation-instigated delisting holding is quite a
startling view of the statute. First, if Congress intended that a
litigation consequence was necessary under little (bb)/big (CC),
92
then Congress could have specifically said so. After all, the
immediately adjacent statutory provisions, namely little (bb)/
big (AA) and big (BB), each contain specific litigation
93
consequences. Second, if Congress intended that a litigation
consequence was necessary, it could have created an umbrella
provision in the text of little (bb)’s preamble itself before the
recitation of the precise subsections in big (AA), (BB), and (CC). It
94
did not do so. Third, it is quite a feat of statutory gymnastics to
ignore the expressed statutory policy scheme of the forfeiture
provisions in which little (bb)/big (CC) is embedded and then
jump over that narrower scheme to rest its decision in the overall
95
broader policy of the 1984 Act. Finally, if Congress intended to
make the delisting provision contingent on the specific litigation
counterclaims to delist or correct patent information under the
nonspecific provision of 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I), then it
could have so amended that provision too. It did not do so even
though that subsection was enacted in the MMA at the same time
96
as the little (bb)/big (CC) provision.
are settlements, which we reviewed in greater detail. None of these settlements did
anything to open up the market to other generic entrants. Eight more were
launches at risk. Only nine included a win by the generic firm, all but one of which
included an invalidation or unenforceability determination as to at least one
brand-name patent.”).
92. See Stone v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995)
(“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to
have real and substantial effect.”).
93. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (citations omitted) (“It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a
view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’ A court must therefore
interpret the statute ‘as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,’ and ‘fit, if
possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.’ Similarly, the meaning of one
statute may be affected by other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken
subsequently and more specifically to the topic at hand.”).
94. 21 U.S.C. 355(j)(5)(D)(i) (2012).
95. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (“A word in a
statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities.
Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text,
considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents
or authorities that inform the analysis.”).
96. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174–75 (2009) (“We cannot
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Another area that does not work, and remains to be seen
whether it will ever work, is the fifth forfeiture bucket—the
97
coercive agreement/antitrust violation forfeiture bucket. This
provision basically provides that if the patentee and the first ANDA
filer (who has the 180-day exclusivity) settle a lawsuit on
anticompetitive terms, the first filer will forfeit the exclusivity. In
section 14:11 of my treatise, I discuss that this provision has no
teeth given the existing case law, which refuses to find any
settlement anticompetitive. Further, because the government is the
sole plaintiff allowed to prosecute an anticompetition case, it will
take years before any decision is capable of triggering the
forfeiture.
However, the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Federal Trade
98
Commission v. Actavis may help. The Supreme Court held that
certain settlements that park the 180-day exclusivity can be deemed
anticompetitive under the traditional antitrust rule-of-reason
99
precedent. Prior cases had deemed parking settlements as
100
presumptively reasonable.
Now, the government and private
ignore Congress’ decision to amend Title VII’s relevant provisions but not make
similar changes to the ADEA. When Congress amends one statutory provision but
not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.”).
97. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) (2012) (“Agreement with another
applicant, the listed drug application holder, or a patent owner.[––]The first
applicant enters into an agreement with another applicant under this subsection
for the drug, the holder of the application for the listed drug, or an owner of the
patent that is the subject of the certification under paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV), the
Federal Trade Commission or the Attorney General files a complaint, and there is
a final decision of the Federal Trade Commission or the court with regard to the
complaint from which no appeal (other than a petition to the Supreme Court for
a writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken that the agreement has violated the
antitrust laws (as defined in section 12 of title 15, except that the term includes
section 5 of title 15 to the extent that that section applies to unfair methods of
competition.”); see also UPADHYE, supra note 16, § 14:11.
98. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (“These
complexities lead us to conclude that the FTC must prove its case as in other ruleof-reason cases.”).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2230 (“Because different courts have reached different conclusions
about the application of the antitrust laws to Hatch-Waxman-related patent
settlements, we granted the FTC’s petition.”). Compare, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d and remanded sub nom.
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (settlements generally
“immune from antitrust attack”), and In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332–37 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (similar), and In re Tamoxifen
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plaintiffs will have an “easier” time proving that the agreement is
anticompetitive. Frankly, due to the inherent nature and
complexities of an antitrust trial, it may still take a long time to
101
resolve.
Because of the threat of anticompetition liability that exists
against the patentee and the first filer, the mere investigation or
initial prosecution of the first filer may be sufficient to cause the
first filer to voluntarily (or perhaps not so voluntarily) relinquish or
102
waive any 180-day exclusivity rights. A relinquishment is just
that—an abandonment of any rights held by the first filer—thereby
promoting competition by allowing any approvable ANDA
applicant to obtain final approval and enter the market. A selective
waiver allows the first filer to individually “anoint” another ANDA
filer with rights to obtain final approval without necessarily opening
103
the door to all ANDA filers.
In summary, the forfeiture provisions are an excellent start to
open up the marketplace to generic competitors alike and
eliminate some of the bottlenecks. Actavis will also likely stop some
104
anti-competitive settlements that bottleneck the exclusivity. The
failure-to-market bucket remains the biggest culprit that maintains
bottlenecks of the 180-day exclusivity and is not working as
planned. Until the improper notion that the 180-day exclusivity is a
vested property right that cannot be interfered with is eliminated,
and that the forfeiture provision is restored to its proper policy
background, games with the exclusivity will continue.

Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212–213 (2d Cir. 2006) (similar), with In re KDur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214–218 (3d Cir. 2012) (settlements
presumptively unlawful), and Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d
1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (presumptively reasonable).
101. See W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir.
2010) (“[D]iscovery in complex cases is expensive and time-consuming . . . .”).
102. Actavis, 133 U.S. at 2234 (“The Circuit’s related underlying practical
concern consists of its fear that antitrust scrutiny of a reverse payment agreement
would require the parties to litigate the validity of the patent in order to
demonstrate what would have happened to competition in the absence of the
settlement. Any such litigation will prove time consuming, complex, and
expensive.”).
103. For further details of the total relinquishment and selective waiver
process, see UPADHYE, supra note 16, §§ 13:14–:16.
104. Actavis, 133 U.S. 2223; see also Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis,
28 ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16, 21.
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IX. THE SCOPE OF LITIGABLE PATENTS IN HATCH-WAXMAN SUITS
Paragraph IV patent litigation is no doubt complicated, time
consuming, and expensive. Plus there is a lot at stake given that
brand manufacturers stand to lose millions (if not billions) of
dollars in sales. Generic companies, though, play the important
role of providing low-cost alternatives to help control healthcare
105
costs. To this end, brand companies have every desire to enforce
as many patents as possible, and generic companies have an equally
strong desire to reduce the number of patents in suit. This
dichotomy has led to another broken part of the original HatchWaxman regime.
Which patents should form the basis of a Hatch-Waxman suit?
Each side of the industry can validly state policy considerations as
to why more or fewer patents ought to be in play. Generic
companies may argue that a lawsuit is confined only to Paragraph
IV patents. Brand companies will argue that any and all patents are
ripe for adjudication. Several examples may help illustrate the
issues and the impact in relation to the underlying statutes. The
first place to start is the statutes to see if they answer the question.
The first statute to examine is 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), which
creates an artificial act of infringement for the ANDA applicant. It
states:
It shall be an act of infringement to submit—
(A) an application under section 505(j) [21 U.S.C. §
355(j)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or
described in section 505(b)(2) [21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)]
of such Act for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of
which is claimed in a patent,
....

105. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574 (2011), reh’g denied, 132 S.
Ct. 55 ( 2011) (“Under this law, ‘generic drugs’ can gain FDA approval simply by
showing equivalence to a reference listed drug that has already been approved by
the FDA . . . . This allows manufacturers to develop generic drugs inexpensively,
without duplicating the clinical trials already performed on the equivalent brandname drug.”); ViroPharma, Inc. v. Hamburg, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2012)
(quoting Biovail Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 519 F. Supp. 2d 39, 50 (D.D.C.
2007)) (“The public ‘has a well-recognized interest in receiving generic
competition to brand-name drugs as soon as possible . . . and a delay in the
marketing of [the generic] drug could easily be against the public interest in
reduced prices.’”).
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if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval
under such Act to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug, veterinary biological
product, or biological product claimed in a patent or the
use of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration
106
of such patent.
The purpose of this section is to confer subject matter
jurisdiction to federal courts so that subsequent Paragraph IV
107
From its plain language,
litigation can be adjudicated.
§ 271(e)(2)(A) defines the filing of an ANDA or § 505(b)(2)
108
application as an act of infringement without more. Whereas the
traditional patent infringement statute, § 271(a), requires some
make, use, sell, import, or offer for sale conduct, § 271(e)(2)
merely requires the filing of an ANDA, and that the filing
constitutes an artificial act of infringement for jurisdictional
109
purposes.
Courts have routinely held that § 271(e)(2) is only a
110
If
jurisdictional statute and provides no substantive rights.
substantive rights were accorded based on its literal language, then
every patent that relates to the drug would be conclusively deemed
infringed simply by filing the ANDA or § 505(b)(2) application.
Moreover, if substantive rights are conclusive, then it is fair to ask
which patent is infringed by the filing of the ANDA. Would it be

106. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2006).
107. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990) (“The
function of the paragraphs in question is to define a new (and somewhat artificial)
act of infringement for a very limited and technical purpose that relates only to
certain drug applications.”); AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P. v. Apotex Corp., 669
F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has described § 271(e)(2)
as creating ‘a highly artificial act of infringement’ triggered upon submission of an
ANDA containing an erroneous Paragraph IV certification.”).
108. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).
109. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013)
(“Taking this last-mentioned route (called the ‘paragraph IV’ route),
automatically counts as patent infringement, and often ‘means provoking
litigation.’” (citation omitted)); In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703
F.3d 511, 515 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Submission of an ANDA constitutes a statutory act
of infringement pursuant to § 271(e)(2) of the Patent Act.”); see 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2)(A).
110. Though § 271(e)(2) is not a pure jurisdictional statute per se, it does
confer jurisdiction. Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 324 F.3d 1322, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (“Section 271(e)(2) is not a jurisdictional statute in the strict sense of
the word.”).
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any patent held by the brand company and any other third party?
Would it be simply any Orange Book-listed patent? If a patent is
deemed to infringe conclusively by the most literal reading of the
statute, then when could an ANDA be approvable based on some
mysterious patent expiry? Finally, without knowing which patent is
infringed, how could any ANDA or § 505(b)(2) applicant design
around a patent? Or could it ever design around a patent given
that the infringement is defined by the act of submitting an FDA
application versus any substantive adjudication of whether any
patent is indeed implicated?
The most logical, correct, and absurdity-avoiding reading of
the statute is that it is simply a jurisdictional statute and confers no
substantive benefits. I am quite sure that if the most literal reading
of the statute deemed an ANDA automatically infringing without
any inquiry, some brand company would have argued this already.
But the question still remains: which patents are implicated by
§ 271(e)(2)?
Recalling the overall framework of the Orange Book,
only certain patents may be listed in the Orange Book.
Section 271(e)(2) has parallel language in 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(b)(1)(G), which governs the kind of patents that can be
listed in the Orange Book.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(G)
Operative Language
The applicant shall file with the
application the patent number
and the expiration date of any
patent which claims the drug for
which the applicant submitted the
application or which claims a
method of using such drug and
with respect to which a claim
of patent infringement could
reasonably be asserted if a
person not licensed by the
owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.

35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)
Operative Language
It shall be an act of infringement to submit—
(A) an application under section 505(j)
[21 U.S.C. § 355(j)] of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act or described in
section 505(b)(2) [21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)] of
such Act for a drug claimed in a patent or the use
of which is claimed in a patent, . . . if the
purpose of such submission is to obtain
approval under such Act to engage in the
commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug,
veterinary biological product, or biological
product claimed in a patent or the use of
which is claimed in a patent before the
expiration of such patent.

Admittedly, exact statutory symmetry does not exist. The
language is slightly different, but parallels do exist.
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Section 355(b)(1)(G) creates the affirmative obligation to list into
the Orange Book the patents that can be implicated by the
approval of an ANDA or § 505(b)(2) application. Once patents are
listed in the Orange Book, the FDA cannot approve any ANDA or
§ 505(b)(2) application until all listed patents have been certified
111
against using one or more of the relevant patent certifications.
Because the ANDA sponsor must certify to one or more patents, it
is only when the sponsor notifies the brand company through the
Paragraph IV notice letter that the brand company even becomes
112
aware of the generic drug application. If an ANDA sponsor
certifies under either Paragraphs I, II, or III, it is not required to
113
notify the brand company at all.
When the brand company receives the Paragraph IV notice
letter, it triggers the forty-five day window to bring suit. If it does so,
114
then the suit generates the thirty-month litigation stay. A thirtymonth litigation stay is not available in the absence of a
115
Paragraph IV certification, which itself is tied to a specific patent.
For example, suppose that a patent is set to expire within thirty
months of an ANDA filing for which the ANDA sponsor filed a
Paragraph III certification. If the patentee learns about the filing
111. A § 505(b)(2) application submits patent certifications under 21
U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). An ANDA submits patent certifications under
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV).
112. See id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), (j)(2)(B).
113. See id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i) (“AGREEMENT TO GIVE NOTICE—An applicant that
makes a certification described in subparagraph (A)(vii)(IV) shall include in the
application a statement that the applicant will give notice as required by this
subparagraph.”).
114. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
115. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (“If the applicant made a certification
described in subclause (IV) of paragraph (2)(A)(vii) [355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV)], the
approval shall be made effective immediately unless, before the expiration of
45 days after the date on which the notice described in paragraph (2)(B)
[355(j)(2)(B)] is received, an action is brought for infringement of the patent that
is the subject of the certification and for which information was submitted to the
Secretary under subsection (b)(1) or (c)(2) of this section [355(b)(1) or
355(c)(2)] before the date on which the application (excluding an amendment or
supplement to the application), which the Secretary later determines to be
substantially complete, was submitted. If such an action is brought before the
expiration of such days, the approval shall be made effective upon the expiration
of the thirty-month period beginning on the date of the receipt of the notice
provided under paragraph (2)(B)(i) [355(j)(2)(B)(i)] or such shorter or longer
period as the court may order because either party to the action failed to
reasonably cooperate in expediting the action . . . .”).
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and chooses to bring suit, that action does not generate a thirtymonth litigation stay. Said another way, the very nature of the
litigation that precipitates a thirty-month stay is a function of a
Paragraph IV certification. This is the first clear indication that
Congress intended that any patent litigation confine itself to the
116
Paragraph IV process. Otherwise, Congress could have simply
permitted a thirty-month stay based on any patent-in-suit.
The 180-day exclusivity also plays a role in defining the
underlying patents in litigation. The existence of the exclusivity is
tied to the Paragraph IV patents. If Congress intended to give a
reward of 180-day exclusivity to ANDA sponsors for moving ahead
with an ANDA filing only, then it should have given exclusivity to
any first ANDA sponsor, irrespective of the underlying patent
certification status. Rather, Congress tied the 180-day exclusivity to
Paragraph IV patents and offered that exclusivity reward to
117
challenge patents. Said differently, if Congress intended that
generic companies enjoy market exclusivity for stepping up and
subjecting itself to patent litigation for simply filing an ANDA
(versus challenging patents), then Congress could have simply tied
the 180-day exclusivity to the act of filing an ANDA itself, whether
or not any patents are challenged. But because Congress chose to
limit the 180-day exclusivity to specific patents that are challenged
via the Paragraph IV certification, then symmetry exists only if the
underlying litigation is limited to just the Paragraph IV patents. It is
asymmetric that only Paragraph IV patents can earn the reward but
that more patents are in play in the lawsuit.
Similarly, Congress enacted the forfeiture provisions to
undermine the expectation of exclusivity. In the failure to market
forfeiture bucket, little (bb)/big (AA) and little (bb)/big (BB)
implicate forfeiture based on the underlying Paragraph IV patent
116. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I) (describing that the thirty-month stay can be
terminated prematurely if the district court decides “that the patent” is invalid or
not infringed). The antecedent basis for “the patent” is the patent that was the
subject of the Paragraph IV certification.
117. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228–29 (2013)
(“Hatch-Waxman provides a special incentive for a generic to be the first to file an
Abbreviated New Drug Application taking the paragraph IV route. That applicant
will enjoy a period of 180 days of exclusivity (from the first commercial marketing
of its drug).”); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 454 F.3d 270, 273
(4th Cir. 2006) (“The 180-day exclusivity period created in § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) is a
significant boon to the recipient.”); see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (establishing
exclusivity period).
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118

litigation. There is nothing in the statute that suggests that
non–Paragraph IV patents can precipitate any forfeiture. This is
further evidence that patent litigation ought to be confined to the
Paragraph IV patents.
With respect to little (bb)/big (CC), we saw in Part VIII above
that the delisting of a patent from the Orange Book must be in
reaction to a formal counterclaim to delist the patent. A
counterclaim to delist a patent itself must have satisfied the prior
procedures related to tendering an offer for confidential access
119
alongside the Paragraph IV notice letter. This, of course, implies
that it is only the Paragraph IV patents that can ultimately be
delisted from the Orange Book.
Accordingly, it is exceedingly strange and contorted to suggest
that (1) only Paragraph IV patents generate a notice letter
informing the brand that the underlying ANDA even exists,
(2) thirty-month litigation stays exist only when tied to a Paragraph
IV patent, and (3) forfeitures can be triggered only by actual
litigation (or counterclaims), but then suggest that non–Paragraph
IV patents can also be part of any patent litigation. The only basis
for that is the flimsy belief that the statutory act of artificial
120
infringement confers a right to piggyback any patent into a suit.
Cases do indeed hold that non–Orange Book patents can be
121
sued upon. Policy considerations also exist as to why all patents
118. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I).
119. See id. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(III).
120. Another flimsy justification for permitting “all” patents to be litigated is
tied to the safe harbor exemption in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). If the principle
purpose of § 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor is that any patent can be “early worked” in
order to support drug development, then any patent should be able to be the
subject in later litigation. If symmetry were a true concern, where only Paragraph
IV patents were part of later litigation, then perhaps only Paragraph IV patents are
immunized by the safe harbor, and non–Paragraph IV patents are not immunized
by the safe harbor.
121. See e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1680
n.5 (2012); AstraZeneca Pharm. v. Apotex Corp., 669 F.3d 1370, 1376–77 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1372–73 (Fed.
Cir. 2006); Glaxo Grp. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir.
2004); Takeda Pharm. v. TWi Pharm., No. C-11-01601 JCS, slip op. at 39 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 8, 2013); Cephalon Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 11-821-SLR, 2012 WL 682045,
at *5 (D. Del. Mar. 1, 2012); Bayer Healthcare L.L.C. v. Norbrook Labs., Ltd.,
Nos. 08-C-0953, 09-C-0108, 2009 WL 6337911, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 24, 2009);
Purdue Pharma Prod. L.P. v. Par Pharm. Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 329, 363 n.49
(D. Del. 2009); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 301 F. Supp. 2d 819, 829
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should be part of a suit. The first is a judicial management policy.
Under a Paragraph IV patent-only system, a trial judge is not
inclined to have non–Paragraph IV patents asserted later (for the
first time) in a launch-based scenario. This scenario would require
a judge to have a round one of Paragraph IV patent litigation,
perhaps allow the generic company to launch, but then face a
round two of non–Paragraph IV patent litigation. This would avoid
eve-of-launch temporary restraining order or preliminary injunc122
tion filings and help judges control their dockets.
The second policy concerns patent infringement damage
liability. While it may be more expensive and complicated in the
first instance to have multiple patents in suits, if there objectively is
potential liability on non–Paragraph IV patents later on, why would
the generic company not want to know that and adjudicate that
prior to being liable for future actual damages? Because of the
uniqueness of the brand-generic drug pricing models, a patentee’s
123
damages may cripple the entire generic drug company’s business.
It therefore seems appropriate to adjudicate all patents in one
proceeding. The policy considerations, though, do not address the
problem with the remedies in the patent suit.
X. THE “ALL” PATENTS-IN-SUIT THEORY HAS FAR-REACHING
CONSEQUENCES FOR REMEDIES
Lost among all litigants and judges so far have been the
remedies. The patent laws include remedies provisions for patent
124
litigation in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e). They are reprinted here with
references to the relevant statutes in brackets as appropriate:
(3) In any action for patent infringement brought
under this [§ 271], no injunctive or other relief may be

(N.D. Ill. 2004) (finding that non–Orange Book patents can be part of the
lawsuit). But see Eisai Co. v. Mut. Pharm. Co., No. 06-3613 (HAA), 2007
WL 4556958, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2007); Abbott Labs. v. Zenith Labs., Inc., 934 F.
Supp. 925, 936 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that only Orange Book listed patents are
part of lawsuit).
122. Judges have the right to control their docket. See In re Fannie Mae Sec.
Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 822 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248,
254 (1936).
123. Each case stands on its own facts and circumstances and not every patent
litigation results in crippling damages. Moreover, what is crippling to one
company may not be crippling to another.
124. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)–(5).
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granted which would prohibit the making, using, offering
to sell, or selling within the United States or importing
into the United States of a patented invention under
[§ 271(e)(1)].
(4) For an act of infringement described in
[§ 271(e)(2)]—
(A) the court shall order the effective date of any
approval of the drug or veterinary biological product
involved in the infringement to be a date which is not
earlier than the date of the expiration of the patent
which has been infringed,
(B) injunctive relief may be granted against an
infringer to prevent the commercial manufacture, use,
offer to sell, or sale within the United States or
importation into the United States of an approved
drug or veterinary biological product, and
(C) damages or other monetary relief may be
awarded against an infringer only if there has been
commercial manufacture, use, offer to sell, or sale
within the United States or importation into the
United States of an approved drug veterinary biological
product, or biological product . . . .
....
The remedies prescribed by subparagraphs (A), (B), and
(C) are the only remedies which may be granted by a
court for an act of infringement described in
[§ 271(e)(2)], except that a court may award attorney fees
under [§ 285].
(5) Where a person has filed an application described
in [§ 271(e)(2)] that includes a certification under
subsection [21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(iv)] or [21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV)], and neither the owner of the
patent that is the subject of the certification nor the
holder of the approved application under [21 U.S.C.
§ 355(b)] for the drug that is claimed by the patent or a
use of which is claimed by the patent brought an action
for infringement of such patent before the expiration of
45 days after the date on which the notice given under
[21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(3)] or [21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)] was
received, the courts of the United States shall, to the
extent consistent with the Constitution, have subject
matter jurisdiction in any action brought by such person
under [28 U.S.C. § 2201] for a declaratory judgment that
such patent is invalid or not infringed.
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Starting with § 271(e)(3), this section refers to infringement
actions brought under § 271(e)(1). The lack of any equitable
enforcement for § 271(e)(1) conduct further solidifies that a safe
125
harbor exists under § 271(e)(1).
The potential mischief really resides in § 271(e)(4). If one
accepts that patent infringement under § 271(e)(2) is only limited
to Paragraph IV certified patents, the remedy under § 271(e)(4)
126
only applies to those patents. This means that the ANDA approval
date will be delayed to the expiry of the last Paragraph IV patent
127
infringed.
This also means that there are dual barriers to
launching the generic drug. The first barrier is that the final court
judgment will include a court injunction to block the launch,
128
irrespective of any FDA approval status. The second barrier is that
the ANDA will only be tentatively approvable and unable to be
finally approved until the relevant infringed Paragraph IV patent
129
expires. Therefore, this means that if the ANDA applicant later
tried to design around the patent (or tried to invalidate it again),
not only would it have to get a court order declaring the patent not
an obstacle to dissolve the injunction, but the FDA would require
that court order to convert the status to final approval. The
125. The safe harbor exemption is given a liberal interpretation and a wide
berth to thereby encompass a lot of activity that would implicate a lot of different
patents. Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005);
Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
126. See, e.g., Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 696 F.3d 1151, 1157 (Fed. Cir.
2012). (“Appellants are generic pharmaceutical manufacturers who filed ANDAs
with the FDA seeking approval to market generic forms of Treximet before the
expiration of Pozen’s patents. Appellants filed their application certifying that the
patents listed in the Orange Book are ‘invalid or will not be infringed’ by the
generic products. Such a certification constitutes an artificial act of
infringement.”). Following the principle of antecedent basis, the second sentence
clearly states that Appellants filed their application certifying against certain
patents. The last sentence states that “[s]uch a certification” must relate to the
certifications of the patents mentioned in the second sentence. Accordingly, this
case implies that jurisdiction only exists for patents that are subject to Paragraph
IV certifications.
127. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A).
128. See Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 789, 825 (E.D. Tex.
2011), aff’d, 696 F.3d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Based on the parties’ written
submissions and the evidence of record, and for the reasons stated above, the
Court grants Pozen’s request for a permanent injunction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(4)(B).”).
129. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A).
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mechanics of this remain to be seen. The FDA may not need a
court order to re-approve the ANDA. For an ANDA applicant,
therefore, obtaining final launch approval would be a two-step
process.
For non–Paragraph IV patents, though, the remedies should
be different. Even if a non–Paragraph IV patent is in suit and is
infringed, it should qualify for the traditional court injunction
against a generic launch; but the non–Paragraph IV patent ought
not deprive the ANDA applicant of future final approval by
130
allowing the re-dating penalty. That is, the ANDA approval status
(from a regulatory affairs perspective) would not be predicated on
the status of non–Paragraph IV patent infringement. In practice,
this would allow the ANDA applicant to design around the patent
(or otherwise invalidate it) and only seek dissolution of an
injunction. The applicant would not have to further pursue the
FDA to convert the ANDA status to final approval. Only a single
barrier exists to marketing. A design around the infringed patent
would only require one step to launch; namely, dissolution of the
injunction.
If, on the other hand, all patents qualified for ANDA approval
re-dating (irrespective of whether Paragraph IV certified), then the
ANDA applicant would have to pursue the two-step process for
each patent. It is unlikely that Congress intended to create a
Paragraph IV certification system if the remedies for the processes
were the same. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Congress intended
that Paragraph IV–certified patents could qualify for 180-day
exclusivity but that any patent could be the basis of liability.
If one were to allow any patent to be part of the litigation and
enjoy the full scope of remedies, then one can easily see how the
system could be gamed by brand-drug companies. First, a brand
company could choose to list only certain patents into the Orange
Book and hold back others to assert during the subsequent
litigation. While an ANDA applicant accepts that for any Orange
Book–listed patent, it will be on actual notice of it and have to
address it through the R&D and court process. It cannot be sure
what patents, if any, that are also out there would need to be
addressed. Therefore, the mere existence of the non–Orange Book
131
patents has some in terrorem effect.

130.
131.

See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1364
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In sum, recognizing that infringed patents (whether
Paragraph IV certified) will generate an injunction, the injunction
itself serves as a barrier. Then a second barrier may exist if the
ANDA approval is re-dated to patent expiry. But in fairness to the
proper administration of the system, only Paragraph IV–certified
patents ought to generate the re-dating remedy. In another twist,
usually the nature of Paragraph IV litigation is predicated on a
patent suit commenced when the ANDA is filed. The remedies
described in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B) and (C) are usually related
to monetary and injunctive relief when a generic company
launches while of the underlying Paragraph IV lawsuit is ongoing.
But could the remedies discussed in § 271(e)(4) apply to patent
suits commenced after the ANDA is approved and after the ANDA
product has launched?
If we examine this fully, we can again see what the mischief is.
For example, suppose Paragraph IV litigation is over (or never
commenced). The ANDA is now finally approved and the generic
company launched its generic product. The brand company
obtains a new patent. Whether it lists this patent in the Orange
Book is not relevant to the generic company who has a final ANDA
approval. If an ANDA is finally approved, neither the law nor the
132
FDA requires the ANDA holder to certify to the patent. From a
regulatory affairs perspective the patent is irrelevant. Now assume
litigation commences and the brand company wins that new patent
suit. Usually for “regular” patent litigation, the remedy is simply the
133
court injunction. But in this case, the brand company seeks not
only the court injunction, but also seeks a withdrawal of the ANDA
approval followed by an order that precludes the FDA from finally
re-approving the ANDA until the patent expires. In essence, the
patentee obtains the dual remedy. Is this correct? It is a strained
reading of § 271(e)(4)(A) to allow this situation to occur. Nothing
134
in the statute contemplates this remedy.
Moreover, it causes an asymmetry between the rights and
expectations of the parties. The generic company is now subjected
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing the in terrorem effect of invalidly granted patents and
how innovations can be stifled because of fear of patents).
132. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012) (stating that only patent
certifications are needed for applications pending, not for approved applications).
133. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.
134. See, e.g., Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., Civ.
Nos. 09-184-LPS, 10-892-LPS, 2012 WL 1901267, at *4 (D. Del. May 25, 2012).
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to this new lawsuit and the new remedy does not receive any benefit
of any 180-day exclusivity or any other benefit. The ANDA sponsor
also faces increased costs from repetitive litigation. The patentee
gets all the benefits of new litigation and new remedies, including
possible monetary damages. Plus, from a policy perspective, the
generic company did not “early work” under a safe harbor against
this new patent because the patent did not yet exist. The
Paragraph IV process was designed to allow for “early working” of a
patent with an ability to vet out the patent issues in litigation.
Finally, allowing a patentee to obtain an FDA re-dating remedy
allows the patentee to game the system more. For example, it may
be that the ANDA sponsor lost the first patent suit but now
concentrated efforts to design around the patent successfully.
Knowing that the ANDA sponsor could apply to the court to
dissolve the injunction, the patentee is then motivated to muck
around in the FDA process to prevent the FDA from granting final
approval. This strategy is well documented through the patentee’s
prolific use of citizen petitions. In fact, Congress reacted to the
citizen petition abuses that attempted to block ANDA approval.
Congress positively responded in enacting 21 U.S.C. § 355(q),
135
which required better petition verification and compliance. If the
FDA had the ability to grant final approval but the ANDA sponsor
was blocked from launching due to a court injunction, it would
allow the company to launch as soon as it could overcome the
patent injunction.
As one can see, if the statutes are construed so that only
Paragraph IV patents are in suit and are the only ones to qualify for
§ 271(e)(4) remedies, then the generic company is happy. If the
statutes are construed so that any patent can be asserted in the
135. See Spear Pharm., Inc. v. William Blair & Co., 610 F. Supp. 2d 278, 286
(D. Del. 2009). (“Following Dr. Reddy’s, the Court cannot at this stage conclude
that Valeant has not adequately stated a claim for relief. This is especially so in
light of the fact that Congress has recognized that the Citizen Petition process is
often abused to delay the introduction of generic drugs, and that one court has
already concluded that ‘Valeant’s citizen petition delayed the approval of Spear’s
ANDA.’”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(A) (regarding citizen petitions); U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS
FOR STAY OF ACTION SUBJECT TO SECTION 505(Q) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG,
AND COSMETIC ACT (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs
/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM079353.pdf
(regarding the certification process and requirement that FDA document delays
caused by citizen petitions).
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litigation and can qualify for the full remedies of § 271(e)(4), then
the patentee is happy. Is there a reasonable interpretation that
makes everyone happy?
XI. A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF LITIGABLE PATENTS—
A NEW MODEL FOR RESOLUTION
An elegant solution of statutory construction exists. Whether a
court will be bold enough to adopt this solution as a matter of
statutory construction remains to be seen. Or perhaps Congress is
needed to yet again step in and plug the hole in the bucket. The
reasonable solution is to allow all patents to be part of a lawsuit but
only Paragraph IV–certified patents can earn a remedy under
§ 271(e)(4)(A)–(C).
First, any patent can be asserted in the patent litigation so long
as there is at least one Paragraph IV certified patent in suit. This
avoids the situation where the patentee tries to bring in only
patents that received 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (“section viii”)
statements. Because the belief is that Paragraph IV patents can only
cause the subsequent lawsuit, then a lawsuit cannot solely be
136
predicated on section viii patents. Because there is at least one
Paragraph IV patent in suit, other patents can also be brought into
the suit and co-litigated. Naturally, only Paragraph IV patents can
serve as the basis for any thirty-month litigation stay. The Paragraph
IV patent in suit provides the vehicle to add the other patents.
As the case progresses, it may be that a trial judgment is not
expected by the end of the thirty-month litigation stay. The
patentee may move to elongate the thirty-month stay only by virtue
137
of the underlying patent that confers that stay. No other patent,
even though in suit, may serve to elongate the statutory thirtymonth stay. A patentee may also use that underlying Paragraph IV
patent to seek a preliminary injunction post-thirty-month stay to
block the launch. Similarly, the patentee may move on
independent grounds for an injunction based on each patent in
suit. If the judge issues the injunction to block the launch, the
136. Sometimes despite receiving no Paragraph IV certifications to patents, a
brand company will sue a generic company assuming (or knowing) that the
company filed section viii statements to relevant patents. As such, this lawsuit will
have no Paragraph IV–certified patents.
137. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (discussing that the court may elongate or
shorten a stay based on the cooperation of the parties); see also UPADHYE, supra
note 16, §§ 11:12–:13 (listing cases discussing elongating the stay).
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judge must opine on each patent, in detail, as to why the injunction
138
was granted. This would allow the defendant to understand the
rationale and appeal that injunction, if desired.
As to remedies, ultimately if the defendant loses, under
§ 271(e)(4)(A), the ANDA approval date would normally be redated to the expiry of the patent. Here, however, to avoid the
misconstruction of the statute, only a Paragraph IV patent would
qualify for the ANDA re-dating remedy under § 271(e)(4)(A). Of
course, if the defendant also loses on a non–Paragraph IV patent,
139
then a traditional permanent injunction would apply, but that
patent would not qualify for ANDA re-dating remedy. For example,
suppose a lawsuit entails a Paragraph IV patent that expires on
July 1, 2018 and a non–Paragraph IV patent that expires on
September 1, 2020. In this case, it is envisioned that with respect to
the 2018 patent, the ANDA is blocked by the court injunction that
normally exists and the § 271(e)(4)(A) re-dating remedy. So, an
ANDA applicant that wishes to design around the patent would not
only have to go to court to get the injunction dissolved, it would
need an order of some sort allowing the FDA to grant final
approval. The 2020 patent, though, would only earn a traditional
court injunction. As such, a successful design-around of the patent
would only require court intervention. In this regard, if the ANDA
applicant chose to accept the 2018 patent as a blocking patent, but
chose to design around the 2020 patent, then the ANDA applicant
could await 2018 and obtain final FDA approval. The remedy under
§ 271(e)(4)(A) would have fully expired. But the applicant cannot
yet launch because of the court injunction on the 2020 patent. All
this applicant need do is apply to the court to dissolve the 2020
patent injunction by arguing that the patent is no longer an
140
obstacle. In sum, the injunction under § 271(e)(4) is a statutory
remedy, whereas the non–Paragraph IV patent injunction would be

138. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
(“According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such
relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”).
139. See id. at 393–94.
140. Though any challenges are case-specific.
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governed under the Supreme Court’s traditional factors from eBay
141
v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
The elegance of this solution satisfies several concerns. First, it
allows patentees to assert more than just Paragraph IV-certified
patents. Second, it allows the court to adjudicate all relevant
patents en toto versus in piecemeal. Third, it allows the ANDA
applicant to vet any potential liability prior to any launch. Fourth, it
properly allocates the statutory remedies to just those Paragraph IV
patents. Fifth, it informs the ANDA applicant of which patents
require the two-step process of dissolving the injunction and going
to the FDA to seek final approval, versus those that require only the
one-step process of dissolving the injunction. Sixth, it allows an
ANDA sponsor to obtain final approval as soon as possible for asset
recognition. A finally-approved ANDA has varying monetary value,
but the approved ANDA is definitely worth more than an only
tentatively approved ANDA. Under this system, if the finallyapproved ANDA has asset value, it can be recognized even though
the underlying product launch is encumbered by the court
injunction.
One last word is needed on post-approval patent litigation. As
mentioned above, once an ANDA is finally approved, the ANDA
sponsor is not required to certify to any new patent that pops up
into the Orange Book. As such, there can be no Paragraph IV
patent litigation. Though a patentee may assert patent
infringement based on the new patent, the only remedy that this
patentee can obtain is court injunction or damages. However, in no
circumstance could this patent cause a re-dating of the ANDA
142
approval. It would be manifestly unfair if new patents could
continue to deprive an ANDA holder of final ANDA approval.

141. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
142. But see Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., Civ.
Nos. 09-184-LPS, 10-892-LPS 2012 WL 1901267 (D. Del. May 25, 2012) (finding a
permanent injunction based on non–Paragraph IV pop-up patent). This was a
single district court case and the judgment on the re-dating of the ANDA legal
issue was not appealed. An appellate court may disagree with this one court.
Moreover, the ruling of one district court does not bind any other district court,
even within the same district. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2033 n.7 (2011)
(quoting 18 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02(2)(d) (3d ed.
2011) (“A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in
either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same
judge in a different case.”).
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XII. THE AUTHORIZED GENERIC: A GOOD OR BAD THING?
We saw from the discussion above that courts wrongfully view
the 180-day exclusivity as a vested, immutable property right. The
purpose of this exclusivity, therefore, is to grant some incentive and
reward to the first ANDA applicant for its Paragraph IV challenge.
But the actual marketplace is different. Generally first ANDA
applicants do not enjoy any real sole exclusivity. Under the MMA’s
new definition of a “first applicant” there might indeed be many
first applicants. In the “old” days, many ANDA applicants could file
on the same day, but the FDA would often resort to time stamps or
videotape to determine which ANDA applicant truly was first and
only first. ANDA applicants facing a hard first-filing date would
often camp out in front of the FDA to rush into the doors to be
143
“first” in the door. The MMA changed that by declaring that all
ANDA applicants who file on the same day are considered first.
Perhaps it is better to consider them as co-first applicants. If there
are co-first applicants, then theoretically they all enjoy the 180-day
144
exclusivity. So in the marketplace, there is a fiction that exclusivity
still means one and only one marketer.
Second, the marketplace is changed by the authorized generic
(AGx). An AGx is not really an ANDA sponsor that markets an
internally developed generic version. It can be, but most often it is
not. Rather, the AGx is really a “license” to market the brand drug
under the brand-drug company’s NDA, but market the brand drug
145
as a generic drug. Usually, the AGx is simply the actual brand
143. The camping out posed even more of a problem post-September 11,
2001 as the police did not look too kindly on camp-outs in front of Washington,
D.C. federal government buildings. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY WHEN
MULTIPLE ANDAS ARE SUBMITTED ON THE SAME DAY 4 (2003), available at http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation
/Guidances/ucm072851.pdf (“Recently, there have been a number of cases in
which multiple ANDA applicants or their representatives have sought to be the
first to submit a patent challenge by lining up outside, and literally camping out
adjacent to, an FDA building for periods ranging from one day to more than three
weeks. Concerns about liability, security, and safety led the property owners to
prohibit lines of applicants before the date submissions may be made.”).
144. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)(bb) (2012) (defining “first
applicant”).
145. In fact, some companies exist where the business model is to be the AGx
of brand pharmaceuticals. For example, Greenstone Pharmaceuticals LLC is the
AGx for its parent brand company, Pfizer, Inc. See, e.g., About Us, GREENSTONE,

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss4/4

44

Upadhye: There's a Hole in My Bucket Dear Liza, Dear Liza: The 30-Year Ann

2014]

HATCH-WAXMAN: RESOLVED & UNRESOLVED GAPS

1351

drug bottled in brand drug bottles, but labeled with the AGx
146
label. It can also be that the brand-drug company contracts (like
a contract manufacturing organization) with the marketing
company to allow the drug to be made, bottled, and sold under
that company’s label. The AGx is rarely an ANDA-approvable
product because, even if the brand gives that ANDA filer a license
to market, that ANDA filer might be blocked by the 180-day
147
exclusivity.
Assume for the moment that a sole ANDA applicant exists and
is ready to market the drug. The brand-drug company will release
the AGx to market and co-compete against the original ANDA
148
applicant.
Once the ANDA applicant launches, the 180-day
http://www.greenstonellc.com/about-us.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2014); see also
About Patriot, PATRIOT PHARMACEUTICALS LLC, http://www.patriotpharmaceuticals
.com/patriotpharmaceuticals/about.html (last updated June 24, 2011); Our
Company, SANDOZ, http://www.sandoz.com/about_us/our_company.shtml (last
visited Jan. 30, 2014). Stand-alone companies also exist, such as Dava, Inc.
See About Dava, DAVA, http://www.davapharma.com/about.htm (last visited Jan.
30, 2014); What We Do, Authorized Generics, PRASCO, http://www.prasco.com/what
-we-do/authorized-generics/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
146. See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 454 F.3d 270, 273
(4th Cir. 2006) (“The pioneer drug maker who holds the approved NDA wants to
stave off possible competition from the ANDA applicants (the generic makers).
One strategy for the NDA holder is to grant a third party a license to sell a generic
version of the drug described in the approved NDA.”).
147. See id. at 274 (“That court held that 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) did not
by its terms prohibit the holder of an approved NDA from marketing an
authorized generic during the exclusivity period. Rather, the court held that the
statute’s limits expressly apply only to later-filed ANDAs.”); see also Teva Pharm.
Indus. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Section
355(j)(5)(B)(iv) says nothing about how the holder of an approved NDA may
market its drug; rather, that provision grants ‘exclusivity’ to the first to file an
ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification by delaying the effective date upon
which the FDA may approve any subsequent ANDA containing a paragraph IV
certification with respect to the same drug.”).
148. One generic company challenged the ability of an AGx to launch during
the 180-day exclusivity. Mylan Pharm., 454 F.3d at 271. In that case, the first ANDA
filer launched and the AGx also launched. Id. Because the AGx cut into the ANDA
product market share, the first ANDA filer lost money. Id. That company then
sued the FDA to force the FDA to block the launch, thereby restoring the sole
market to the ANDA sponsor. Id. The company lost as the court held that the FDA
does not have the power to block the launch of an AGx. Id. (“After the FDA
denied the petition, Mylan commenced this action against the agency under the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The district court dismissed
the case. We affirm the dismissal, concluding that the statute does not grant the
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exclusivity is triggered and that clock begins to run. In the
marketplace, though, the two companies compete, usually on price,
which then drives market share. Customers are usually indifferent
as to whether they buy the AGx or the ANDA sponsor’s drug
149
product.
In fact, signing up with the AGx usually ensures
continuity of supply (avoidance of supply chain disruptions) and
obvious similarity of patients to the drug they were taking in the
past. But for the ANDA sponsor, the existence of the AGx costs lots
150
of money.
Here is an example of how the marketplace dynamics work.
First, we assume that a $1 billion per year brand drug exists. If the
ANDA applicant were alone, then it would make about $320
million over the six months of exclusivity. This is because there is
typically a conversion of 80% market share from brand drug to
generic drug and the ANDA sponsor prices at 80% of the brand
151
152
drug. This dynamic exists for half a year. If we assume just one
competitor exists, then the market is dramatically different. Now,
FDA the power to prohibit the marketing of authorized generics during the 180day exclusivity period afforded to a drug company in Mylan’s position.”).
149. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM
EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM IMPACT 44 (2011), available at http://www.rxobserver.com
/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/2011-FTC-generic-drug-report.pdf.
150. Mylan Pharm., 454 F.3d at 273 (“The pioneer drug maker who holds the
approved NDA wants to stave off possible competition from the ANDA applicants
(the generic makers). One strategy for the NDA holder is to grant a third party a
license to sell a generic version of the drug described in the approved NDA. The
economic benefits of this practice are clear. Such an authorized generic appeals to
patients because it is sold at a lower price than the branded pioneer drug. It also
appeals to the pioneer drug maker, who benefits from sales of the authorized
generic even after the patent protecting the pioneer drug has expired. By selling
an authorized generic during the exclusivity period enjoyed by the first
paragraph IV ANDA applicant, the pioneer drug maker prevents that applicant
from winning all of the customers who want to switch from the branded drug to a
cheaper generic form. ‘[T]he additional competition [for the applicant] from an
authorized generic may result in significantly less profit during the period of
180–day exclusivity than if’ the applicant ‘had no authorized-generic competition
during that time.’”).
151. Margaret A. Hamburg, FDA Comm’r, Remarks at the Generic
Pharmaceutical Association Annual Meeting: Challenges and Opportunities for
the Generic Drug Industry (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents
/Speeches/ucm294978.htm.
152. Hence $2.8 million ($1 billion per year) multiplied by 80% price,
multiplied by 80% share conversion, multiplied by 50% for the half year, equals
$320 million.
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even if we assume that the original ANDA sponsor takes 50%
market share but, due to price competition, the price drops to 40%
153
price, then that sponsor may make only $80 million.
Typically though, most drugs are not $1 billion or more. Most
are not even $600 million or more. Rather, most are in the range of
$100–400 million. Even using $400 million as the new base, the
revenues are less (e.g., $128 million if solely on the market,
$40 million with the AGx). For a $100 million drug, the revenues
could be $32 million and $10 million. After 180 days, the market
could open up again with even more generic launches, thereby
further reducing market share and price. For the $1 billion drug,
after the 180-day exclusivity is over (hence about 6 months remain
in the year), the original solely exclusive generic company will face
dramatic market share reduction, perhaps to about 15%, but price
may drop to about 10%. This results in the remainder of the year
sales of $7.5 million and then about $15 million per year thereafter.
For a $100 million drug, the remainder of the year will be about
$750,000 and about $1.5 million per year thereafter. It may also
happen that price decreases to about 5%.
The point of this is that the AGx indisputably affects the
marketplace during and after the 180-day exclusivity. By far the
clearest winners in having AGxs in the marketplace are the
consumers and payors. The overall loser is the original ANDA
applicant who had to share the market in a duopoly with the AGx.
The brand company is a winner too because it earns money from
its AGx arrangement. Presumably while it held a monopoly, it
recovered its investment. Therefore, the AGx income continues to
contribute profit.
XIII. FDA WRONGFULLY SAYS THAT MARKETING THE AUTHORIZED
GENERIC TRIGGERS EXCLUSIVITY
But what happens if the brand company and the first-filed
ANDA applicant settle their lawsuit in which the ANDA applicant
becomes the AGx marketer? When commercial marketing
commences, the ANDA applicant does not market its own ANDAapproved product, but instead markets the AGx itself. What
happens to the 180-day exclusivity? Does it remain “parked” with
153. $2.8 million multiplied by 40% (half of the original 80% market
conversion), multiplied by 40% price, multiplied by 50% for the half year, equals
$80 million.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

47

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 4

1354

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:4

the ANDA itself, only to be triggered by forfeiture and/or a
commercial marketing of the actual ANDA product? Why would
this be desirable? First, by signing the AGx deal, the ANDA sponsor
is guaranteed to have a product to sell. A deal minimizes any supply
chain or FDA approval problem for the ANDA sponsor. Second, by
potentially parking the 180-day exclusivity, it bars the subsequent
ANDA filers from obtaining approval. Therefore, the first ANDA
sponsor maintains a veritable monopoly over other generic versions
(or a duopoly with the brand company version).
This is where unlawful judicial gap filling again occurred. In a
very strange and very nonstatutory interpretation, a federal district
court in West Virginia ruled that when the first generic company
marketed the AGx instead of marketing its own ANDA product,
154
that event somehow triggered the 180-day exclusivity. In the
nifedipine XL case, Mylan (as the first ANDA applicant) and Pfizer
were locked in typical Paragraph IV litigation regarding Pfizer’s
155
thirty milligram form of Procardia XL. They settled on terms that
granted Mylan the AGx rights to the thirty, sixty, and ninety
milligram forms of Procardia XL and also rights to market Mylan’s
156
thirty milligram generic form that was the subject of its ANDA. In
other words, Mylan’s ANDA was for just the thirty milligram form,
but through the settlement Mylan also received the rights for the
three other strengths as the AGx. Mylan began marketing all three
strengths per its AGx deal. Teva (through its licensor Biovail, a
subsequent ANDA filer) initially asked Mylan to waive its exclusivity
as part of a business agreement. Mylan and Teva did not
consummate a deal. Instead, Teva filed a citizen petition asking the

154. Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 207 F. Supp. 2d 476, 488 (N.D. W. Va.
2001).
155. Id. at 481 (“Procardia XL is sold exclusively by Pfizer for three available
strengths (30, 60 and 90 mg). In April 1997, Mylan became the first generic
manufacturer to file an ANDA directed towards a nifedipine tablet which is a
generic bioequivalent of the 30 mg extended release Procardia XL tablet. Mylan’s
ANDA contained a ‘IV certification’ with respect to the Pfizer patent. Thereafter,
Pfizer filed a civil action against Mylan in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania for infringement of its patent.”).
156. Id. (“On February 28, 2000, Pfizer and Mylan entered into a settlement
agreement which, according to Mylan’s complaint, (a) stipulated to the dismissal
of the Pfizer–Mylan civil action, (b) granted Mylan a license to sell a private label
version of 30, 60 and 90 milligram Procardia XL nifedipine extended release
tablet supplied by Pfizer, and (c) permitted Mylan to market its own 30 milligram
ANDA product.”).
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FDA to grant it final approval by stripping Mylan of its exclusivity.
157
The FDA agreed and granted Teva final ANDA approval. Mylan
sued the FDA to declare its actions unlawful.
The FDA won at trial and the case was not appealed to
judgment. The court relied on the FDA’s interpretation that,
though it was undisputed that Mylan did not market its own ANDA
product, the FDA deemed the marketing of the AGx to be a
commercial marketing trigger within the meaning of the thenexisting 180-day exclusivity law. The court stated:
The FDA determined that Mylan’s marketing of the Pfizer
product following the settlement was “commercial
marketing” that began the 180-day exclusivity period. The
FDA explained its ruling:
whether Mylan markets the produce [sic] approved in
its ANDA or the product approved is Pfizer’s NDA is
of little import to the statutory scheme; Mylan has
begun commercial marketing of generic nifedipine,
permitting Mylan to market nifedipine without
triggering the beginning of exclusivity would be
inconsistent with the intent of the statutory scheme.
Therefore, because more than 180 days had passed
since March 28, 2000, the date the FDA determined
Mylan began the commercial marketing, the exclusivity
period had expired. At this point, this Court believes that
the FDA’s interpretation of the phrase “commercial
marketing of the drug under the previous application” is a
reasonable one. On the basis of this part of the FDA
ruling, which this Court believes is a reasonable
interpretation of the statute, Mylan must be deemed
unlikely to succeed on the merits and, therefore, the
158
defendants would prevail.

157. Id. at 482 (“Teva, a licensee of Biovail, filed a Citizen Petition with the
FDA in which Teva requested that the FDA determine that the ANDA submitted
by Mylan for a 30 milligram nifedipine extended release tablet for the treatment
of hypertension and angina was not eligible for or, alternatively, is no longer
eligible for the 180-day exclusivity period provided by the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments and that the FDA approve the ANDA of Biovail for a 30 milligram
extended release nifedipine tablet. The FDA granted Teva’s Citizen Petition on
February 6, 2001.”).
158. Id. at 488 (citations omitted).
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The FDA relied on the 2000 version of the statute. In 2000, the
statute that governed the running of the 180-day exclusivity was as
follows:
(iv) If the [ANDA] contains a certification described in
subclause (IV) of paragraph 2(A)(vii) [Paragraph IV
certification] and is for a drug for which a previous
application has been submitted under this subsection
continuing such a certification, the application shall be
made effective not earlier than one hundred and eighty
days after—
(I) the date the Secretary receives notice from the
applicant under the previous application of the first
commercial marketing of the drug under the previous
application, or
(II) the date of a decision of a court in an action
described in clause (iii) holding the patent which is the
subject of the certification to be invalid or not
159
infringed, whichever is earlier.
Here, under subparagraph (I), the operative statutory phrases
are as follows: the “applicant under the previous application” is the
first ANDA filer, and the phrase “commercial marketing of the
drug under the previous application” must refer to the commercial
160
marketing of the drug of the first ANDA. If it were intended
and/or reasonable to trigger the exclusivity by any sale by the first
ANDA applicant, then it would have said so. But the statute is
explicitly clear that the drug that is first marketed must be the drug
that was the subject of the first ANDA itself. The district court
either misinterpreted the statute or wrongfully deferred to the
161
FDA’s interpretation of the statute under Chevron step 1. In
fairness though, the district court entertained this case on a
preliminary injunction, and with further analysis or explanation,
the court might have come to a proper construction.
Here is an example of policy-based gap filling at its best (or
worst). The policy justification is understandable. The plain
language of the statute does not contemplate that the marketing of
a completely different product, here the AGx, can trigger the 180day exclusivity. To the FDA and this one district court, the 180-day
159. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).
160. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
161. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–43 (1984).
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exclusivity is applicant specific, not ANDA specific. But the 180-day
exclusivity is only created by a very specific kind of ANDA filing—
the ANDA filing that is the first ANDA applicant to certify under
Paragraph IV to at least one Orange Book patent. It is not created
by any other ANDA filing. Accordingly, the FDA’s and district
court’s interpretations are not statutory because the marketing of
an AGx under a NDA has nothing to do with an ANDA. Had Mylan
chosen to appeal, or in the event another scenario like this occurs
again, the D.C. Circuit would likely have held that the statute does
not contemplate triggering the 180-day exclusivity simply by the
marketing of an AGx.
XIV. SCOPE OF INDUCED INFRINGEMENT AND NULLIFICATION OF THE
MENS REA REQUIREMENT
There are two types of infringement: (1) direct infringement
and (2) indirect infringement. Direct infringement is a strict
162
liability tort and is governed under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). A direct
infringer is the real trespasser on the patent rights. Indirect
infringement does not require an inducer to directly infringe but
results in liability when the inducer knowingly puts things into
motion that cause a direct infringement. For indirect infringement,
there is a state-of-mind or mens rea component. Indirect
infringement usually comes in two forms: (i) inducement to
infringe under § 271(b), or (ii) contributory infringement under
163
§ 271(c).
The policy-based gap filling ideology has not left
inducement to infringe untouched. Rather against the actual law,
courts have essentially morphed the mens rea state-of-mind
164
requirement into a strict liability standard. This mischief usually
162. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
163. Id.
164. The law requires courts to evaluate the state of mind. Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005) (“The inducement
rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct,
and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage
innovation having a lawful promise.”); DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471
F.3d 1293, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“As a result, if an entity offers a product with
the object of promoting its use to infringe, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, it is then liable for the resulting acts
of infringement by third parties. ‘The inducement rule . . . premises liability on
purposeful, culpable expression and conduct.’ Grokster, thus, validates this court’s
articulation of the state of mind requirement for inducement.”); Civix-DDI, L.L.C.
v. Hotels.com, L.P., 904 F. Supp. 2d 864, 869 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“As such, because
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plays out when arguing over the generic drug label and its
165
contents.
Under the ANDA law, the generic company must copy the
166
brand product label, except for some minor changes.
This
ensures the sameness of the generic and brand drug label. Though,
the generic company can omit certain information from the label.
The omitted information is often, but not always, related to
patents. A working example may indicate how the inducing
infringement plays out.
Suppose brand drug XYZ is indicated for multiple disease
conditions #1, #2, #3, and #4. Indications #2, #3, and #4 are
protected by patents #2, #3, and #4 respectively, but indication #1 is
no longer (or never was) patented itself. The method of
use/treatment patents usually take the traditional form of a
method of treating disease condition X by administering to a
patient a therapeutic amount of drug XYZ. To this end, without

induced infringement is not a strict liability tort, there is a genuine dispute of
material fact whether Hotels.com knowingly induced DoubleClick’s alleged
infringement and possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.”
(citation omitted)).
165. AstraZeneca L.P. v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“The pertinent question is whether the proposed label instructs users to perform
the patented method. If so, the proposed label may provide evidence of Apotex’s
affirmative intent to induce infringement.” (citation omitted)); Braintree Labs.,
Inc. v. Novel Labs., Inc., CV No. 11–1341(PGS), 2013 WL 211252, at *11 (D.N.J.
Jan. 18, 2013) (“Therefore, through its proposed label, Novel intentionally
induces patients to ingest a composition infringing claims 15 and 18.”); Bone Care
Int’l, L.L.C. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 09–CV–285(GMS), 2012
WL 2126896, at *9 (D. Del. June 11, 2012) (“In the Hatch-Waxman context,
‘[s]tatements in a package insert that encourage infringing use of a drug product
are alone sufficient to establish intent to encourage direct infringement’ for
purposes of inducement to infringe under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).”).
166. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2012). (“[I]nformation to show that the
labeling proposed for the new drug is the same as the labeling approved for the
listed drug referred to in clause (i) except for changes required because of
differences approved under a petition filed under subparagraph (C) or because
the new drug and the listed drug are produced or distributed by different
manufacturers.”); see also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574 (2011),
reh’g denied, 132 S. Ct. 55 (2011). As a result, brand-name and generic drug
manufacturers have different federal drug labeling duties. A brand-name
manufacturer seeking new drug approval is responsible for the accuracy and
adequacy of its label. A manufacturer seeking generic drug approval, on the other
hand, is responsible for ensuring that its warning label is the same as the brand
name’s label.
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more, if the generic company includes the four indications, then it
could be sued for infringing patents #2, #3, and #4 under an
inducement to infringe theory. Prototypically, in inducement to
infringe cases, the generic company is not sued for direct
infringement because it is likely not directly administering drug
XYZ to the patient. Rather, the claim for inducement is that the
generic drug label includes patented method of treatment
indications and therefore induces the local doctor, pharmacist, or
patient to infringe. In other words, the generic drug company’s
label is an explicit instruction to aid and abet the infringement.
To get around this, generic companies will often avail
themselves of the so-called section viii statement or “carve-out”
167
strategy. A generic company under section viii may redact or
delete patented indications, leaving at least one unpatented
indication. Returning to the example, the generic company may
therefore redact indications #2, #3, and #4 from its label, leaving
only unpatented indication #1 left. Theoretically, the generic
company can only market its generic drug for that one indication.
But generic companies do not “market” their drugs in well-known
ways.
Generic companies introduce their drug products at the top of
the distribution chain. The wholesalers then distribute down the
chain ultimately to the retail pharmacy. Generic companies sell
most, if not all, of their products to upstream wholesalers, rarely
selling (if at all) to the local pharmacy. Generic companies do not
advertise products on television, radio, or print media. Generic
companies do not have sales representatives (known as “detailing”)
that visit doctors, do not sponsor medical symposia or conferences,
and do not have large marketing budgets to promote generic
drugs. Rather, a generic company may have just a few national
167. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii); Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Lupin,
Ltd., 676 F.3d 1316, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“First, the ANDA applicant can include
a statement, known as a ‘section viii statement,’ that the applicant is not seeking
approval for the method of use that is claimed in the patent.”); AstraZeneca, 633
F.3d at 1047 (“Apotex also submitted a section viii statement asserting that it was
not seeking approval for the once-daily method of use claimed in the ′603 and ′099
patents and that its proposed generic label would contain no explicit mention of
once-daily administration.”); Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Actavis, Inc., No. 12-366RGA-CJB, 2012 WL 6212619, at *3 (D. Del. Dec. 5, 2012) (“A section viii statement
indicates that the applicant wants to market the generic drug for a different
method of use than those claimed by relevant patents listed in the Orange
Book.”).
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account managers that deal with customers at the wholesale or
national chain drug store level. It would be incredulous to say that
generic drug companies “market” or “promote” individual generic
168
drugs in the same way that brand companies do.
Generic
companies, instead, rely on the state-level substitution laws to get
169
their products into the hands of the patient users.
When faced with possible section viii carve-outs, the brand
company recognizes that the unpatented indication may provide
the vehicle to carving out the patented indications. The company
also recognizes that the patient will take the generic drug for
whatever uses the doctor and patient agreed to. While the patient
and doctor may know that the intent of the drug prescription is to
treat a patented indication, the generic drug company does not
and cannot know. In fact, it might be callous (but true) to say that
the generic drug company does not care how the patient uses its
drug. All the generic drug company does is put its product at the
top of the distribution chain and whatever happens to the product
downstream does not matter. Whether a patient takes the drug for
indication #1 as labeled or for carved-out indications #2, #3, or #4,
or for a complete off-label use, is of no consequence to the generic
company.
Accordingly, a brand company, when faced with the carve-out
situation, may try to sue the generic company for inducement to
170
infringe the carved-out uses. But to succeed, the brand company
171
is supposed to prove a specific intent to induce infringement.
168. See, e.g., IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2008),
abrogated by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (“Detailing involves
tailored one-on-one visits by pharmaceutical sales representatives with physicians
and their staffs. This is time-consuming and expensive work, not suited to the
marketing of lower-priced bioequivalent generic drugs (drugs that are
pharmacologically indistinguishable from their brand-name counterparts save for
potential differences in rates of absorption). The higher profit margins associated
with brand-name drugs leaves the personal solicitation field open to brand-name
drug manufacturers, who in the year 2000 spent roughly $4,000,000,000 on
detailing.”).
169. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (“But because pharmacists, acting in full
accord with state law, substituted generic metoclopramide instead, federal law preempts these lawsuits.”). See, for example, MINN. STAT. § 151.21 (2012) or LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37:1241(A)(17) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.), for a
description of when pharmacists may substitute generic drugs.
170. See Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Wockhardt USA, No. 12-cv-3967, 2013
WL 5770539 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2013).
171. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
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The brand company may allege that simply by putting it in the
distribution channel, the generic company expects, wants, desires,
or otherwise intends that all uses will be practiced and, hence,
172
liability attaches. But the courts have been clear that specific
intent is required, and such proof is rarely available.
But sometimes the proof may be there. For example, suppose
that the brand drug XYZ is a $500 million drug. The brand
company would know roughly how the sales are split amongst the
indications. Suppose that indication #1 (the unpatented one) is a
very small sliver of the $500 million and that most of the sales are
keyed to the other patented indications. Often times a generic
company in creating volume forecasts and inventory management
models may create charts that show how the brand drug sales grew
over time, what the expected new growth will be, and new volumes.
Tie this information into when the generic drug company chose to
begin development of the product and now there might be a story.
The information may show that when the drug was indicated only
for unpatented indication #1, it had small sales and hence the
generic company did not want to make a generic of it. But as the
sales increased when new indications came along, it suddenly
formed a new attractive candidate to pursue for generic
development. Over time, the information on new growth
attributable to new indications may also be tied to the expected
generic sales and volume forecasts. But here, again, the need for
specific intent is required to show that the infringement was known
173
and intended.
Courts, though, to shortcut a highly intense factual inquiry,
may convert this specific intent state of mind requirement into a
174
strict liability offense based simply on the label. If the generic
2013), reh’g denied (Oct. 25, 2013).
172. See, e.g., Novartis, 2013 WL 5770539, at *8 (discussing that remaining FDA
labeled indication was only 0.3% of the overall market and 99.7% of the market
was for the carved-out use). Novartis argued that no generic in its right mind is
actually limiting its sales to the 0.3% market and it is obvious that the entire game
plan is to capitalize on the 99.7% carve-out use. Id.
173. Again, each case stands unique and nothing herein should be construed
as some categorical statement of liability. Each case must be evaluated fully on its
own facts and circumstances.
174. See generally Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692
F.3d 1301, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2014 WL 112700 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014)
(No. 12-786) (“Induced infringement is in some ways narrower than direct
infringement and in some ways broader. Unlike direct infringement, induced
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company has any information that colorably implicates the
patented method, then some will simply say that the label is an
175
instruction and hence is an inducement.
This “gotcha” was
176
predicated on the Grokster copyright case.
This is wrong because the mere words must amount to more.
Courts short circuit the state of mind analysis by relying on the
Grokster copyright case and other cases that use the word
177
“instruction” as a basis for specific intent to induce infringement.
But it is important to understand what the “instruction” was in
Grokster and related cases to put it into context. Grokster was a case
involving file sharing over the Internet. The very existence and
purpose of the Grokster system was to share files over the
178
Internet. Grokster instructed users how to engage in infringing
179
uses. The file sharing had no other legitimate purpose except as a
file-sharing system. When users had problems or issues, Grokster
infringement is not a strict liability tort; it requires that the accused inducer act
with knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.”).
175. See AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Cobalt Pharm., Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 586,
599 (D. Mass. 2005) (“Stripped of these arguments, Plaintiffs’ active inducement
claim rests entirely on language in Cobalt’s proposed labeling instructions and
package insert.”). One case goes even farther to suggest that even if the label is not
“infringing,” the mere fact the drug is sold could be the basis for inducement.
Wyeth v. Sandoz, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 508, 521 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (citations
omitted) (“Furthermore, ‘[e]ven if [Sandoz] successfully persuaded the finder of
fact that the labels [do] not instruct, direct, or encourage infringement . . . this
would not be legally sufficient to establish that the labels do not induce
infringement.’”).
176. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
177. Id. at 936 (citations omitted) (“Evidence of ‘active steps . . . taken to
encourage direct infringement,’ such as advertising an infringing use or
instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show an affirmative intent that the
product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement was encouraged
overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely sells a
commercial product suitable for some lawful use.”).
178. Id. at 919–20 (“Respondents, Grokster, Ltd., and StreamCast Networks,
Inc., defendants in the trial court, distribute free software products that allow
computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks, so called
because users’ computers communicate directly with each other, not through
central servers.”).
179. See id. at 923–24 (“The record is replete with evidence that from the
moment Grokster and StreamCast began to distribute their free software, each
one clearly voiced the objective that recipients use it to download copyrighted
works, and each took active steps to encourage infringement.” (citations
omitted)).
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provided technical support regarding how to continue the
180
copyright infringement. So, Grokster not only provided the tool
to infringe, but it also provided lessons regarding infringement.
The system was specifically designed to share files and bypass
security measures. Grokster also advertised its essentially infringing
181
use. It provided a category of music knowing full well that the
182
music was copyrighted. Further, Grokster, though intending to
provide file sharing for copyrighted works, took no effort
183
whatsoever to mitigate against copyright infringement. Finally,
the Grokster management showed a specific intent repeatedly in
promotions and in internal documentation that it wanted copyright
infringement to occur, provided tools to make it happen, and
aided and abetted the infringement in almost every conceivable
184
fashion. In short, its very existence was to circumvent copyright
law. Accordingly, the instructions in Grokster were specifically and
solely designed to file share and violate the copyright law. One can
think of the instructions as being part of the undisputed master
plan to file share. The Court, though, also noted categorically that
185
simply distributing a product that might infringe is not enough.
180. Id. at 923.
181. Id. at 925 (“Thus, StreamCast developed promotional materials to market
its service as the best Napster alternative.”). Napster was a similar file sharing
software used by many to exchange copyrighted materials illegally.
182. Id. at 926 (“The point, of course, would be to attract users of a mind to
infringe, just as it would be with their promotional materials developed showing
copyrighted songs as examples of the kinds of files available through Morpheus.
Morpheus in fact allowed users to search specifically for ‘Top 40’ songs, which
were inevitably copyrighted. Similarly, Grokster sent users a newsletter promoting
its ability to provide particular, popular copyrighted materials.” (citations
omitted)).
183. Id. at 926–27 (“Finally, there is no evidence that either company made an
effort to filter copyrighted material from users’ downloads or otherwise impede
the sharing of copyrighted files. Although Grokster appears to have sent e-mails
warning users about infringing content when it received threatening notice from
the copyright holders, it never blocked anyone from continuing to use its software
to share copyrighted files. StreamCast not only rejected another company’s offer
of help to monitor infringement, but blocked the Internet Protocol addresses of
entities it believed were trying to engage in such monitoring on its networks.”
(citations omitted)).
184. Id. at 925 (“StreamCast even planned to flaunt the illegal uses of its
software; when it launched the OpenNap network, the chief technology officer of
the company averred that ‘[t]he goal is to get in trouble with the law and get sued.
It’s the best way to get in the new[s].’”).
185. Id. at 937 (“Accordingly, just as Sony did not find intentional inducement
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The flavor and context of the Grokster case is clear. For
inducement to infringe, the Court required bona fide culpable
conduct where the inducer wanted the infringement to happen,
planned to make it happen, goaded/aided/abetted the infringer to
infringe, provided tools to make it happen, and expressly
advertised in all words and actions to ensure that infringement
would happen. Even when users had trouble infringing, Grokster
expressly instructed users how to cure the problem to ensure
186
infringement would happen. Even the Federal Circuit, sitting en
187
banc, restated these principles in the post-Grokster era.
The patent field adopted the copyright standard that requires
specific intent to induce infringement. That is not controversial.
What are controversial are the policy-driven decisions that have
predetermined the outcome. If the concept of inducement
requires a genuine aiding and abetting that rises to the level of a
malicious coconspirator, then finding liability for simply having
verbiage on a label, without more inquiry into the context and the
state of mind of the generic company, is wrong.
Under the courts’ strict liability standard, a generic company is
liable simply because of the label contents. No amount of behindthe-scenes mitigation is worth anything. No opinion of counsel is
despite the knowledge of the VCR manufacturer that its device could be used to
infringe, mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses
would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary
acts incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support
or product updates, support liability in themselves. The inducement rule, instead,
premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does
nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a
lawful promise.” (citations omitted)); see also DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471
F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part) (“The ‘mere
knowledge of possible infringement by others does not amount to inducement;
specific intent and action to induce infringement must be proven.’”).
186. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 923 (“From time to time, moreover, the companies
have learned about their users’ infringement directly, as from users who have sent
e-mail to each company with questions about playing copyrighted movies they had
downloaded, to whom the companies have responded with guidance.”). By way of
analogy, the inducer solicited others to rob a bank; sat at the table with the bank
robbers during the planning phase; provided the plans to the bank, technical
details about the vault and tools to use to open the vault, timing of security guard
paths and schedules, and details about when the most opportune time was to hit
the bank; and provided the getaway car and keys. In short, here the only thing the
inducer did not do was actually rob the bank.
187. DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1306 (“Grokster, thus, validates this court’s
articulation of the state of mind requirement.”).
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worth anything. For example, in practice, the counsel for a generic
company may mitigate specific intent by (1) reviewing documents
to ensure the market plans do not implicate patented indications;
(2) reviewing regulatory documents to ensure that sufficient
information is carved out of the label; (3) conducting training
sessions with the generic company’s sales and marketing personnel
to advise on what can or cannot be done; (4) creating mitigation
plans that, in the event a breach occurs, remedies a breach timely
and correctly; or (5) obtaining independent legal advice that
indicates the generic company has taken appropriate steps to
188
remove any specific intent to induce infringement. None of these
exculpatory measures is meaningful to a judge who decides that
strict liability attaches simply because of the label.
A further problem is the practical reality that a generic
company’s drug labels are rarely seen by anyone in the prescribing
chain. In the distribution of a generic product, multiple bottles are
packed into boxes with the labels (usually on a printed pad of
paper) thrown in. Rarely are labels adhered to the bottles
themselves. At the wholesaler or distributor, the box is opened, and
the bottles are either repacked into boxes or put onto shelves. The
labels are thrown out. Ultimately, it is very rare that the retail
pharmacist will even see a generic company’s drug label. Moreover,
because generic companies do not promote their products to
doctors directly, a doctor will rarely (if ever) see a generic
188. In a controversial case, the Federal Circuit recently held that an
inducer’s good-faith belief that the relevant patent is invalid may be sufficient to
negate the specific intent for induced infringement. See Commil USA, L.L.C. v.
Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Under our case law, it is
clear that a good-faith belief of non-infringement is relevant evidence that tends to
show that an accused inducer lacked the intent required to be held liable for
induced infringement.”); see also Bettcher Indus., Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661
F.3d 629, 649 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding opinion of counsel regarding
noninfringement “admissible, at least with respect to [defendant]’s state of mind
and its bearing on indirect infringement”); Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569
F.3d 1335, 1351 (Fed. Cir.) (finding that a reasonable belief of noninfringement
supported a jury verdict that the defendant lacked the intent required for induced
infringement), amended in part on reh’g, 366 Fed. App’x 154 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1025 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (holding that defendant’s “belief that it can freely practice inventions found
in the public domain” supports “a jury’s finding that the intent required for
induced infringement was lacking”); DSU Med. Corp., 471 F.3d at 1307 (finding a
demonstrated belief of noninfringement sufficient to support a jury verdict that
the defendant did not induce infringement).
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189

company’s drug label. Even office copies of the Physician Desk
Reference (PDR) do not have an actual copy of the generic drug
company’s label. Usually, the PDR contains only the original brand
company’s drug label. A generic company’s drug label may be
available through intense searching on the Internet. But that is
hardly a ringing endorsement that the label is so prominent that it
induces a doctor to prescribe the generic drug for patented uses.
Usually, the absence of evidence is not evidence of its absence.
Here, though, the absence of evidence of inducement is indeed an
190
actual absence of evidence.
The author is cognizant that, if the inducement to infringe
actually requires the state of mind inquiry, then it will complicate
the case. The expenses will rise for both brand and generic
companies alike. The complexity is bound to tie up more judicial
resources with discovery disputes. Moreover, any future trial will be
more complex. With the state of mind being so important and
factually driven, it is unlikely (without “smoking gun” evidence)
191
that summary judgment could be granted. Each party could likely
189. See Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at 17–18,
Wyeth Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., Civ. A. No. 1:09-cv-01810-FJS (D.D.C.
Sept. 22, 2009), 2009 WL 3226432 (“Because healthcare professionals assume that
generic and branded drugs are completely interchangeable, they generally do not
scrutinize the generic drug and the branded drug for labeling differences.”);
see also Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 12–13, Wyeth Pharm., Inc. v.
Food & Drug Admin., No. 1:09-cv-01810-FJS (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2009), 2009
WL 3460818 (“Healthcare professionals justifiably rely on the fact that the HatchWaxman Act requires generic drugs to be the same as their branded counterparts
in all material respects and assume, as intended by Congress, that a generic
product is freely interchangeable with the brand name drug and that it bears the
same labeling as its branded counterpart. Accordingly, they have no reason to
scrutinize the labeling for any differences and, as a matter of clinical practice,
rarely do so.”).
190. In his experience, the author has never heard of a generic company
directly detailing a generic drug product to a doctor. The author has never
received an inquiry from a doctor as to what information existed in the generic
company’s drug label and what differences existed, if any, between the generic
company’s drug label and the brand company’s drug label. In fact, the author has
never received an inquiry from any doctor to provide the generic company’s drug
label.
191. United States ex rel. Taylor-Vick v. Smith, 513 F.3d 228, 231 (5th Cir.
2008) (“It is indeed well-settled, as Vick points out, that we hesitate to grant
summary judgment when a case turns on a state of mind determination.”); Miller
v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 906 F.2d 972, 974 (4th Cir. 1990) (agreeing with the
general rule that summary judgment is rarely granted when a state of mind is an
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proffer sufficient genuine issues of material fact to thwart summary
judgment. Imposing the strict liability infringement standard
circumvents this and morphs the patent challenge to invalidity. But
traffic management should not and cannot drive the result. Other
solutions ought to be tried.
A solution would be to impose similar pleading requirements
on the plaintiff to plead inducement with particularity. Under the
rules of pleading inequitable conduct, a defendant (putative
infringer) is required to plead the specific intent to defraud the
192
patent office. The courts have imposed significant burdens on
the defendant to allege the “who, what, where, when, why, and
193
how” of the fraud. In an effort to curb inequitable conduct
defenses, the Federal Circuit has required Twombly-Iqbal–like
194
Generally, pleading this specificity is governed
particularity.
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b).
If Rule 9(b) specificity is required for defensive purposes, then
perhaps it is equally applicable for plaintiff’s purposes. If the
plaintiff cannot plead inducement with particularity, then a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be appropriately granted.
While Rule 8(a)(2) generally requires only a plain and concise
195
statement in the complaint, Rule 9(b) requires certain pleading
element of a claim; however, the rule did not apply in this case due to [Plaintiff’s]
admission that he willfully violated the Act in question); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co.
of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Turtur, 892 F.2d 199, 205 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Questions of intent,
we note, are usually inappropriate for disposition on summary judgment.”); 60 Ivy
St. Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1437 (6th Cir. 1987) (“Summary judgment
is seldom appropriate in cases where the parties’ intentions or states of mind are
crucial elements of the claim because of the likelihood of self-serving testimony
and the necessity for the factfinder’s credibility determinations.”).
192. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (stating that to prove inequitable conduct, the alleging party must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant “misrepresented or
omitted material information with the specific intent to deceive the PTO”).
193. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“Based on the foregoing, and following the lead of the Seventh Circuit in
fraud cases, we hold that in pleading inequitable conduct in patent cases, Rule
9(b) requires identification of the specific who, what, when, where, and how of the
material misrepresentation or omission committed before the PTO.”).
194. Id. at 1326 (“Rule 9(b) requires that ‘[i]n all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity.’ ‘[I]nequitable conduct, while a broader concept than fraud, must be
pled with particularity’ under Rule 9(b).”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
686–87 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
195. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring, in a claim for relief, “a short and plain
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196

with particularity. Note that Rule 9(b) only specifies that fraud
and mistake need be pled with particularity and that “malice,
intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind” may
197
be pled generally.
Accordingly, while pleading inequitable
conduct with true Rule 9(b) particularity may be more palatable,
there does not seem to be any prohibition against requiring
inducement to infringe to be pled with some particularity that is
beyond Rule 8(a)’s general rubric without actually invoking
198
Rule 9(b) as a categorical requirement.
The danger with
categorically invoking Rule 9(b) is that precedent does not allow
199
for formally adding to the list of particulars. If pleading direct
(regular) infringement only requires plain Rule 8 specificity, there
is support for pleading indirect infringement with heightened
Rule 8 specificity that does not rise to the level of Rule 9(b)
200
specificity.
In conclusion, with regard to inducement to infringe, it is time
to return the inducement to infringe inquiry back to its roots. A
clearer understanding of inducement and the particulars of how it
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
196. Warner Chilcott Co., v. Amneal Pharm., L.L.C., Civ. A. Nos. 11-5989
(FSH), 11-6936(FSH), 12-24774(FSH), 2013 WL 6627694, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 13,
2013) (“Inequitable conduct is subject to the higher pleading standards of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(b).”).
197. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
198. A defendant wanting a court to adopt the heightened standard of
pleading should not formally invoke Rule 9(b). Pleading a quasi-heightened
standard that is rooted in Rule 8(a) is better because it does not provide an
upfront end run around Rule 9(b)’s limited list.
199. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–15 (2002); Pratt
v. Tarr, 464 F.3d 730, 731–32 (7th Cir. 2006).
200. Brandywine Commc’ns Techs., L.L.C. v. Casio Computer Co., 912 F.
Supp. 2d 1338, 1343 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (citations omitted) (“The Federal Circuit’s
recent opinion in In re Bill of Lading provides persuasive authority on the pleading
requirements for induced infringement. The Federal Circuit concluded that
whereas fulfilling the requirements in Form 18 is sufficient to plead a claim of
direct infringement, ‘Form 18 should be strictly construed as measuring only the
sufficiency of allegations of direct infringement, and not indirect infringement’
and a court must look to Supreme Court precedent for guidance regarding
pleading requirements for claims of indirect infringement. Specifically, to state a
claim for induced infringement, a plaintiff must affirmatively plead ‘facts plausibly
showing that [Defendants] specifically intended their customers to infringe the
[patent] and knew that the customer’s acts constituted infringement.’ Moreover,
the Supreme Court has clarified that induced infringement requires ‘knowledge
that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.’” (citations omitted)).
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applies to generic companies is needed. Because inducement is
factually intensive, it will require courts and litigants to really flush
out the facts and evaluate them; it should not permit any further
shortcutting by permitting complaints to allege bare-bones induced
infringement.
XV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is not to wail on the Hatch-Waxman
Act, the courts, or the parties. But this article shows how
implementations have caused significant problems in the
marketplace and how court-driven policy has also been a culprit in
the Act’s interpretations and executions.
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